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Executive Summary 
Security sector reform is a framework for supporting the development of 
effective, legitimate and accountable security and justice institutions that are 
consistent with democratic norms, good governance and the rule of law. SSR 
has become accepted as an integral component of peacebuilding for 
international and regional organizations and the donor community. Key 
elements in SSR include an integrated, holistic approach that recognizes the 
links that exist between functional sectors, such as between policing and 
justice. It also recognizes the role of customary or traditional justice and 
security providers in many parts of the world. Donors are recommended to 
adopt joined-up approaches and to harmonize and coordinate with other 
donors. And a recent development has been the shift towards a more 
pragmatic and flexible approach of seeking „best fit‟ rather than „best 
practice‟. 
 
Norway is internationally recognized as a major donor in SSR, yet there 
have been few attempts to map how Norwegian actors perceive SSR, how 
much assistance is provided, and the ways in which support is framed and 
channelled. This report provides an overview of the types of support and 
assistance that Norway has provided to SSR, focusing primarily on the 
period 2008-2010. It examines how Norway has provided support across the 
various functional sectors (defence, police, intelligence, and justice) and 
examples of bilateral and multilateral projects funded in various countries. 
Although not comprehensive, the report‟s coverage of selected activities and 
countries is, we believe, illustrative of the Norwegian approach.  
 
Norway supports SSR projects and processes through multiple institutional 
vectors at the governmental level, funded through a complex mix of budget 
streams, over which the MFA maintains a central position. Norway provides 
high levels of funding to multilateral actors involved in SSR-relevant 
activities and has been a strong supporter of strengthening the capacities of 
the UN in SSR. It further funds a diverse range of bilateral assistance 
projects across the spectrum of SSR.  
 
Norway‟s current approach to SSR tends to be decentralized, which appears 
to account for some problems in coherence, coordination and information-
sharing, and low visibility nationally of Norwegian support in this domain. 
There is no overarching strategic policy framework or guidelines on SSR, 
although an important initiative in institutionalizing coordination between 
the MFA and MOD has recently occurred concerning SSR support for the 
defence sphere in the Western Balkans. The lack of a common framework 
towards SSR further explained uncertainty about the concept among 
Norwegian actors in Oslo and its embassies about whether specific activities 
constituted SSR. This ambiguity also accounts for the challenges in 
identifying overall levels of funding for SSR, since projects may be 
categorized under various overlapping headings.  
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We encountered numerous examples of good practice in Norway‟s support 
to SSR, such as attention to local ownership, good governance and 
accountability, as well as a strong sense of commitment among those 
responsible for implementing support to SSR. Due to the high level of 
professional standards across the armed forces, police, and justice sectors, 
Norway can offer a wide range of support and assistance across the 
functional sectors. A few „niche areas‟ of Norwegian functional expertise 
include training and mentoring by military and police, including the Coast 
Guard, defence management, and assistance by justice personnel especially 
in Western-type legal systems. Gender-sensitive approaches to SSR is also a 
clear Norwegian niche area.  
 
Compared with some other major donors, there is a high degree of 
transparency and access to information on Norwegian governmental 
contributions to SSR. There also appears to be a strong and consistent 
commitment to multilateral approaches and donor coordination. Norway‟s 
flexibility as a donor was also widely perceived as a distinct advantage. 
 
Defence-related security sector reform (DSSR) assistance is currently 
provided primarily to countries in the Western Balkans and Afghanistan, 
although Norway is beginning to focus increasingly on the West Caucasus 
region and Africa. DSSR is provided to strengthen democratic control of 
armed forces, and build up the capacity and interoperability of armed forces 
to engage in international peacekeeping operations. It is seen as an important 
means of exporting values, including the principles of democratic control, 
transparency and accountability, and an affordable means of strengthening 
governance, transferring norms and exerting influence in transitional 
environments. While this is appreciated in recipient countries and among 
Norway‟s allies, it is less apparent that the Norwegian public is well 
informed about what Norway is doing in SSR. Support to DSSR constitutes 
an instrument for Norwegian foreign policy at a time when demands outstrip 
its human and material resource capacities for military deployments in 
support of peacekeeping operations.  
 
DSSR is delivered through two funding channels: that which is eligible to be 
considered official development assistance, which is provided by the MFA, 
and that which not ODA-eligible, which is funded from the MOD budget. 
The majority of the 2010 MOD budget for SSR, 45 million NOK, was ODA-
eligible. DSSR has been institutionalized through certain structures and 
processes, including a DSSR unit created at Norwegian Defence University 
College, which coordinates DSSR efforts and functions as a think tank. 
 
Norway supports police reform in SSR through the deployment of police in 
international peacekeeping missions, bilateral programmes, and through the 
development of UN capacities for police reform at strategic level. Between 
80-90 police personnel are available at any one time, based on the general 
guideline that one percent of Norway‟s operational police force can be 
deployed abroad. In 2008-2010, the MFA provided approx. NOK 284.8 
million to police reform efforts implemented by the Police Directorate 
(POD). Deployment of Norwegian police abroad prioritizes multilateral 
operations, and Norway has participated in 38 missions since 1989. The 
Police Directorate maintains a rigorous selection procedure and seeks to 
send abroad officers only where it is expected they have something to 
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contribute. POD also prioritizes gender equality and efforts to fight SGBV, 
and emphasizes its efforts to recruit female police for international peace 
operations. Effort is made to match skills and expertise to local needs in 
terms of police reform 
 
Styrkebrønnen (Rule of Law Pool of Advisors), administered by the 
Norwegian Ministry of Justice, is a primary mechanism for implementing 
justice sector reform assistance. In 2008-2010, the MFA provided NOK 81 
million to fund the activities of Styrkebrønnen, which today consists of 
around 100 experienced, pre-selected judges, public prosecutors, military 
prosecutors, police prosecutors, defence attorneys and prison and probation 
advisers. The strength of this approach is the availability of expert teams for 
rapid deployment to provide advice and assistance in reforming almost every 
link in the „chain of justice‟, and is particularly suited for bilateral assistance 
programmes. The use of Styrkebrønnen is limited by certain factors, 
however, including the high cost of team deployments and the lack of 
expertise in Islamic and traditional justice systems. 
 
The intelligence system tends to be one of the most neglected components in 
SSR. An important exception was Norway‟s support for reform of the 
federal-level Bosnia and Herzegovina Intelligence-Security Agency (OSA), 
which received over NOK 9 million from 2008-2010. The programme was 
administered and coordinated by the Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs, in close cooperation with the OSCE and Office of the High 
Representative. The program sought to build capacity, competence, improve 
technical infrastructure of the new state institution, while developing a sense 
of institutional team identity among representatives of different ethnic 
groups. Through DCAF, Norway has also supported intelligence oversight 
capacity building in the Kosovo assembly, and has supported the training of 
parliamentary staffers in security, defence and intelligence affairs throughout 
the Western Balkans.    
 
Norway‟s development community does not appear to have engaged widely 
with SSR. This may be linked to lack of familiarity with the approach and, in 
the context of Afghanistan, with a concern about the blurring of lines 
between humanitarian and development issues and the military on the other. 
It was also suggested that the politicization of SSR in certain cases such as 
Afghanistan results in assistance programmes that are developed without the 
involvement of developmental actors and approaches.   
 
Although lacking specific policy guidance on gender and SSR, Norway has a 
2006 national action implementation plan for UN Security Council 
Resolution 1325, which was updated with a new strategic plan on women, 
peace and security in 2011. These constitute the overall framework for 
integrating gender perspectives into Norwegian policy on peace and security. 
The MFA has funded DCAF for the development of concepts and training 
tools, conducting basic research, and implementing projects on gender and 
SSR. Police reform assistance projects have also paid attention to the 
particular needs of women in conflict or transitional settings.    
 
Other actors, including non-governmental organizations and foundations, 
consultancy firms and private security companies, are increasingly being 
used by donors to develop and implement SSR assistance projects. Between 
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2008-2010, Norway provided NOK 28.6 million to DCAF, including core 
contributions to its International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT). 
Funded projects for DCAF focused mainly on the development of gender-
sensitive approaches to SSR, capacity building in parliamentary oversight of 
the security sector in Kosovo and the Western Balkans. ISSAT develops 
strategic-level guidance and support for donors in SSR. The International 
Management Group has received NOK 55.7 million over the past three years 
to implement projects in the law enforcement and justice sectors in the 
Western Balkans. The Norwegian Refugee Council received NOK 58.6 
million over three years for its legal aid programmes for internally displaced 
persons. Independent evaluations were only available for ISSAT and NRC.   
 
The survey of Norway‟s areas of engagement with SSR begins by examining 
selected projects in three countries of the Western Balkans, a key region for 
Norway‟s SSR efforts. The nature of assistance has progressed from 
humanitarian assistance to support for democratization and Euro-Atlantic 
integration, and spans all functional areas of the security sector. In Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, for example, the Norwegian MOD has been involved in 
capacity-building for long-term defence planning within the Bosnian MOD. 
Norway has also supported the establishment and capacity-building of the 
federal-level Intelligence-Security Agency (OSA). Norway is lead nation of 
the NATO Trust Fund for resettlement and retraining of military personnel, 
which in 2010 received close to NOK 4 million in contributions from 
Norway. Several projects have moreover assisted the national authorities in 
developing an effective, independent and efficient judiciary at the state level. 
 
Norwegian SSR efforts in Montenegro have been predominantly focused on 
enhancing democratic civilian oversight over the armed forces contributing 
to the building of the new Ministry of Defence, a project funded to the tune 
of NOK 4.8 million between 2008-2010. There is also a substantial bilateral 
assistance effort ongoing in the justice sector through IMG, which has 
received NOK 9.4 million over the last two years to help reform the 
misdemeanor system in Montenegro and implement an Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT) Strategy for the Judiciary. There is an 
on-going discussion with Montenegro regarding a bilateral cooperation 
involving the coastguard since 2008.  
 
Serbia remains the key focal point of Norwegian SSR engagement in the 
region, reflecting a special relationship and historically close ties dating back 
to World War II. The defence sector has been subjected to the most 
structured efforts of cooperation. Norway is lead nation for the NATO Trust 
Fund for resettlement and retraining of redundant military personnel. 
Norway also contributes substantially to both military educational reform as 
well as capacity building within the Serbian MOD on defence planning and 
strategy.  The increasing internationalization of the Serbian defence sector is 
reflected in the area of military-medical cooperation and Serbia‟s 
contribution to the Norwegian field hospital in the UN peace operation 
MINURCAT in Chad. Norway has since 2001 been involved in a long-
running and broad ranging bilateral police reform project, JuNo, with the 
Police Directorate as the main implementing agent. Since 2007, Norway has 
also, to a relatively lesser degree, been involved in justice sector reform 
through the project „Improving the delivery of justice in the courts in 
Serbia‟, implemented by IMG.  
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In the Caucasus region, Norwegian assistance to Georgia has mainly been 
focused around capacity-building in the legal sector through the deployment 
of the Norwegian Rule of Law Pool (Styrkebrønnen). Approximately NOK 
20 million was allocated for this purpose over the period 2008-2010. Since 
2004 the Norwegian Mission of Legal Advisors (NORLAG) has contributed 
to the development of a strategic plan for Georgia‟s criminal justice system, 
with an emphasis on making the penal system more humane. The Norwegian 
Refugee Council‟s ICLA project contributes to the efforts in the justice 
sector, and has received around NOK 5.25 million within the same 
timeframe. The military component of Norwegian support is channeled 
through the NATO Professional Development Program, where Norway is 
lead nation on human resource management. 
 
In Africa, the survey examines Norwegian contributions to SSR in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Somalia, Sudan and South 
Sudan. Norway‟s engagement with SSR in DRC has consisted of a military 
secondment to a strategic-level position at MONUSCO on SSR, and the 
secondment of several civilian observers (a specialist in sexual violence, a 
field coordinator, and an expert in witness protection) to MONUSCO. 
Norway is also engaged in justice sector reform and the fight against 
impunity, focusing on building the skills and capacities required to process 
cases of sexual violence. 
 
Norway‟s support to SSR programmes in Liberia demonstrates flexibility 
and sensitivity to local context and needs. Norway contributes with capacity 
building, training and infrastructure, and has also provided funding for the 
restructuring and training of the Liberian National Police (including in the 
managing of reported rapes and SGBV). Up to eleven Norwegian police 
officers serve in UNMIL to act as advisers and to cooperate with their 
Liberian counterparts. Norway further supports the UN‟s Joint Programme 
for combating SGBV. Norway has also contributed to a rehabilitation and 
reintegration programme former combatants. Finally, Norway through the 
NRC supports efforts to facilitate access to justice and resolve land disputes 
for Liberia‟s many returnees. 
 
Capacity and institution building in the security and justice sectors have been 
areas of focus for Norwegian assistance to Somalia. Assistance is 
concentrated in four key areas: peace and reconciliation, humanitarian 
assistance, vocational training and education, and institution-
building/capacity-building (including SSR). In 2010 Norway allocated 
money to the Somali security sector through the UNDP Rule of Law and 
Security (ROLS) project, which includes a training program for police 
officers. SSR in the Somali context, however, has proven to be a complex 
matter. Lacking adequate controls and follow up, the outcome of assistance 
cannot be reliably predicted. 
 
Implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and capacity 
building in South Sudan have constituted the main pillars of Norwegian 
engagement in Sudan. Norway supports UNDP‟s Disarmament, 
Demobilization & Reintegration (DDR) programme, and provides support to 
the justice sector through several UNDP programs and through the 
Norwegian Refugee Council. Norway is a substantial contributor to police 
reform, predominantly in South Sudan. Several Norwegian police officers 
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are currently seconded to UNMIS, and a trilateral police-training program is 
undertaken with South Africa as the implementing actor. Norway has 
supported a number of programmes for local peacebuilding, democratic 
institutions, and for security and justice, including police training. 
 
Finally, Afghanistan is one of the priority countries for Norwegian SSR 
engagement.  Norway currently has 500 military deployed to ISAF and 
several dozen civilians, including 23 police advisers, 7 in Kabul and 16 in 
Meymaneh, Faryab. Norway‟s military component is responsible for 
providing security and facilitating development and reconstruction. It is also 
increasingly involved in partnering and training of the Afghan National 
Army (ANA). The civilian component generally consists of several 
elements, including development, police officers, prison officers, and 
civilian advisers who monitor and collect information and report on the 
political and development situation. 
 
Training of the ANA is explicitly linked to its participation in the NATO-led 
International Stabilization Assistance Force (ISAF) through the Operational 
Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) that advises an Afghan brigade in 
Mazar-e-Sharif and the OMLT Kandak based in Faryab province. Gradually 
the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Faryab has become more 
involved in capacity building with the Afghan National Security Forces. 
Norway contributes police officers across three different organizations: the 
UN Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA); the EU Police in Afghanistan 
(EUPOL-A); and the bilateral police project Norway-Afghanistan (NORAF). 
The latter has focused on recruiting and training female police officers 
through the “Female project”. On the judicial side, Norway has had prison 
advisers based in Faryab, and has provided funds to build a new prison in the 
provincial capital Meymaneh. From 2005-2008 legal and justice sector 
advisers from Stykebrønnen were deployed to Kabul, where they functioned 
as mentors for the Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF), with a special 
emphasis on counter-narcotics prosecution service and court. Norway 
moreover supports the UN-administered Law and Order Trust Fund for 
Afghanistan (LOTFA), as well as the National Justice Programme 
administered by the World Bank multi-donor Afghanistan Reconstruction 
Trust Fund (ARTF).  
 
Afghanistan has been a large engagement for Norway. However, its 
engagement has been criticized as being “supply-driven” rather than 
demand-driven. Also its SSR assistance has been described by one 
respondent as based on a “political decision” to engage rather than on the 
usual assessment and planning procedures. The lack of planning was 
generally seen as a major cause of problems. Several of our respondents 
questioned whether SSR is part of the coalition strategy for engagement. 
 
 
Key findings and recommendations 
 
SSR constitutes an important instrument for furthering some of Norway‟s 
key foreign policy objectives and national values. Norway‟s comparative 
advantages include its international profile as a consistently generous donor; 
its commitment to multilateralism; its transparency and international image 
as an honest broker; its commitment to the values of good governance, 
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democratic control and accountability, and local ownership that lie at the 
heart of security sector reform; and its nimbleness – the flexibility of its 
funding and its capacity to react quickly to changing requirements.  
 
Yet, although Norway is a member of the primary group of international 
donors supporting SSR, it has a decentralized and rather fragmented 
approach which does not fully optimize the potential impact and 
effectiveness of its contributions. We identify a need to develop a more 
coherent approach to SSR, possibly through the development of a strategic 
policy framework and further institutionalization of coordination 
mechanisms. While developing a more coherent approach through a cross-
government coordinating mechanism may reduce some of the flexibility that 
departments currently enjoy in supporting SSR projects, it would likely 
result in a more effective impact of projects for the beneficiaries and more 
efficient use of resources. We also suggest implementation of more 
consistent assessment, monitoring and evaluation of SSR projects. We 
recommend increasing awareness of Norway‟s SSR engagements within 
government and in the wider public sphere. Further development of justice 
sector assistance is also recommended, as is further efforts to coordinate this 
with related assistance in police reform projects. Finally we suggest 
developing a framework for evaluating decisions to outsource SSR 
assistance.  
 
Developing a strategic policy framework could help further a common 
understanding of the broad goals of SSR, the interconnectedness of the 
security and justice systems, and foster a more coherent approach across the 
various Norwegian governmental and non-governmental actors involved in 
the many aspects of supporting SSR processes.  
 
We believe that there is also need for more consistent use of pre-project 
assessments as well as of monitoring and evaluation of major or long-
running projects supporting SSR. This applies to multilateral projects and 
outsourced support to international as well as those implemented by 
Norwegian non-governmental organizations.  
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1. International context and trends in 
SSR 
1.1 Definition and evolution of security sector reform  
Security sector reform (SSR)1 first emerged in the late 1990s as a policy 
framework articulated by Clare Short, the Secretary of State for the UK‟s 
Department for International Development (DFID).2 Through SSR, DFID 
sought to support the transformation of safety, security and justice 
institutions in transitional, post-conflict and post-authoritarian environments. 
SSR seeks to enhance the ability of states to meet the range of security and 
justice needs that their societies face, in a manner consistent with democratic 
norms, sound principles of governance and the rule of law.3 It emphasizes 
principles of transparency, accountability, inclusiveness and responsiveness 
to the needs of the populations that security and justice institutions are 
mandated to serve. SSR notably links the establishment of more effective 
citizen security and equitable justice to better enabling development efforts 
and poverty alleviation to take place.  
 
As the popularity of the concept spread, the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD)‟s Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) furthered the development of SSR through the establishment of a 
policy statement and paper on SSR which was endorsed by member states at 
its 2004 high-level ministerial meeting and subsequently published as a 
DAC reference document. 4 The OECD subsequently embarked on a two-
year consultative process to close the gap between policy and practice, 
resulting in a handbook on SSR that provides guidance for the 
implementation of SSR policy.5 SSR has been integrated into the 
peacebuilding approaches of the United Nations and various regional 
organizations. Most major donors have based their approaches to SSR on the 
OECD DAC handbook.   
 
According to the OECD, the security sector generally comprises the 
following groups of actors:6  
                                                     
1  Alternative terms that have emerged that capture the essence of SSR but with slight 
differences in meaning include security sector transformation, security system reform, 
security sector development, and security sector assistance. The term security sector 
reform will be used in this report, as this term occurs most frequently in documents of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other governmental actors in Norway.  
2  Clare Short, Security, Development and Conflict Prevention, Speech at the Royal College 
of Defence Studies, London, 13 May 1998; Clare Short, Security Sector Reform and the 
Elimination of Poverty, Speech at the Centre for Defence Studies, King‟s College, 
London, 9 March 1999; and Clare Short, Developing the Security Sector Reform Agenda, 
Speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 4 February 2002.  
3  OECD, Security System Reform and Governance, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series 
(Paris: OECD, 2005), p. 11. 
4  OECD (2005). 
5  OECD OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and 
Justice (Paris: OECD, 2008).  
6  OECD (2005), pp. 20-21.  
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 Core security actors: armed forces, police, gendarmerie, intelligence 
and security services, paramilitary forces, presidential guard, coast 
guard, border guard, customs authorities, reserve or local security 
forces (civil defence forces, national guards, militias); 
 Security management and oversight bodies: Executive, national 
security bodies, parliament and parliamentary committees, ministries 
of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs, customary and traditional 
authorities, financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget 
offices, financial audit and planning units), and civil society 
organizations (civilian review boards, public complaints 
commissions); 
 Justice and law enforcement institutions: judiciary, justice 
ministries, prisons, criminal investigation and prosecution services, 
human rights commissions and ombudsmen, customary and traditio-
nal justice systems; 
 Non-statutory security forces: liberation armies, guerrilla armies, 
private body guard units, private security companies, political party 
militias. 
 
While the OECD DAC approach predominates, there is some variation in 
how international actors define the precise parameters of the domain 
encompassed by the term „security sector‟. A key area of disagreement 
concerns the inclusion of the justice system within a comprehensive 
understanding of security sector. Opponents of the comprehensive approach 
acknowledge that justice and security systems are complementary and 
require common approaches, but point to important differences in their aims 
and means, and the risks entailed by overextending the definition of 
security.7 Nevertheless, most international actors active in supporting SSR, 
recognising important inter-related aspects of security and justice, have 
incorporated some aspect of the justice system into their understanding and 
approach to security sector reform. The United Nations, for example, 
includes the criminal justice system in its definition of the security sector, 
defining it as „the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the 
management, provision and oversight of security in a country‟, including 
institutions concerned with defence, law enforcement, corrections, 
intelligence, border management, customs, and civil emergencies, as well as 
„elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of 
alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force‟.8 
 
Coherent and integrated approach 
According to OECD DAC, the focus for international actors in supporting 
SSR should be to support partner countries in achieving four overarching 
objectives: 
i) Establishment of effective governance, oversight and accountability in the 
security system. 
ii) Improved delivery of security and justice services. 
iii) Development of local leadership and ownership of the reform process. 
                                                     
7  For example, see Anthony C. Howlett-Bolton, „Security System Transformation in Sierra 
Leone, 1997-2007: Aiming for Holistic Approaches to Justice Sector Development‟, 
GFN-SSR Working Paper No. 7 (October 2008), p. 3.  
8  United National General Assembly and Security Council, Security, peace and 
development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform, Report 
of the Secretary-General, A/62/659-S/2008/39, 23 January 2008, para. 14. 
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iv) Sustainability of justice and security service delivery.9  
 
SSR emphasizes holistic, coherent and coordinated processes for reforming 
the often closely inter-related components of the security and justice 
systems. SSR seeks to avoid the „stove-piped‟ approach, in which decision-
making on reforms in one functional domain, such as policing, take place in 
an insulated manner, with little or no consultation or coordination with other 
parts of the security sector, such as the criminal justice system. Too often in 
the past even clearly interdependent functional domains have been seen in 
isolation from one another, resulting in a lack of coordination between their 
respective reform processes, and resulting frequently in the failure to achieve 
intended results. SSR encourages a system-wide perspective to identify areas 
where coordination of sectoral reforms is important. The close links between 
policing, the judiciary and corrections in any state system demonstrates the 
necessity of coordinating reforms between these functional domains. 
Receiving far less attention, the intelligence sector constitutes a core element 
of a state‟s national security and internal security systems, yet typically 
remains one of the least addressed components in security sector reform.  
 
A holistic approach to SSR also recognises that in many developing 
countries, people turn to informal or traditional authorities for the provision 
of security and the resolution of disputes and dispensation of justice. SSR 
then must take into account that formal state institutions are not necessarily 
the only, or the most effective or trusted, sources of security and justice for 
many citizens.  
 
From the donor side, emergent „good practice‟ recommends that SSR 
programming result from a „joined-up‟ or whole-of-government approach 
(WGA) in which agencies and ministries within a government work more 
coherently together to develop a comprehensive response to a fragile or 
developing state. SSR processes are recognised to be complex, involving a 
potentially wide diversity of activities, institutions, expertise and skills. A 
number of departments within a donor government may be involved in 
developing bilateral SSR programmes, and it may be difficult to ensure that 
all actors, while fulfilling their individual mandates, speak with a coherent 
voice and follow a joint strategy. Development of a whole-of-government 
approach in several donor countries has involved establishment of cross-
government working groups or units that deal with post-conflict 
peacebuilding, security and justice reform issues. The cross-government 
composition of the unit helps to break down institutional culture barriers 
between departments, while advancing a shared understanding of the 
different departmental mandates, perspectives and objectives.10 As security 
and justice, governance and development are recognised to be closely linked 
in SSR, there has been a corresponding effort to promote more integrated 
and coherent approaches among the agencies and departments responsible 
for those areas of assistance, with the aim of improving the planning and 
implementation and outcomes of a donor country‟s international SSR 
assistance.  
 
A key means of achieving a more coherent donor approach to SSR is 
through the articulation of a clear policy or guidance note on SSR that 
                                                     
9  OECD (2008), p. 21.  
10  OECD DAC (2008), p. 237.  
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applies to all departments or agencies contributing to SSR assistance. 
Beyond the overall SSR policy document, country-specific integrated SSR 
policies may also set out for a particular country.11 A whole-of-government 
approach (WGA) prescribes mechanisms and instruments for coordination 
and creating coherence, such as joint assessments, planning, monitoring and 
evaluation, and sometimes common pools of funding for SSR activities 
involving both ODA and non-ODA funds for use by the main ministries and 
departmental actors engaged in SSR programmes and flexible decision-
making procedures. Through joint assessments and planning, a WGA seeks 
to better align and integrate a donor government‟s contributions to SSR in a 
particular country with its broader country strategy. While responsibility for 
coordination of this political area of engagement naturally falls to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, certain donors have alternatively created 
dedicated units for inter-agency or interdepartmental coordination.12  
 
Beyond improved internal donor coherence, good practice also recommends 
international harmonization of the approaches of donors to SSR. The idea of 
„whole-of-system‟ approaches encapsulates the idea of international and 
regional organizations and other international actors can better develop 
policy coherence and a comprehensive international response to fragile 
states. Nevertheless, achieving better internal coordination among actors in a 
donor capital may come at the cost of external harmonization. Alternatively, 
improving harmonization of approaches in the same thematic domain among 
different donor countries, such as of defence ministries, may reduce 
integration with other departments and ministries or even with local 
stakeholders.13 
 
An important contribution to improving SSR was advanced in the World 
Development Report 2011, which focused on helping developing states to 
improve citizen security, justice and jobs, underscoring the link between 
security and development and encouraging closer cooperation between 
agencies involved in development and security and justice reform. The WDR 
2011 advanced an approach to transforming societal and state institutions 
responsible for security and justice that focused especially on building their 
legitimacy and finding solutions that are based not on „best practice‟ but on 
„best fit‟ – that is, not technically perfect solutions that are often based on 
Western models and experiences, but pragmatic solutions that are adapted to 
local political, social and economic conditions, as well as the capacity of 
local institutions.14 Finding „best fit‟ solutions hinges on conducting 
adequate assessments as part of the planning of reform programmes, as well 
as monitoring during implementation to enable learning, and rigorous 
evaluation of results, in other words, mechanisms for continuous feedback 
and learning.15 Best fit approaches also rely on pragmatism and flexibility in 
                                                     
11  Conflict Research Unit, „Towards a Whole-of-Government Approach to Security System 
Reform‟, Background Paper, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 
„Clingendael‟, prepared for the conference Whole-of-Government Approaches to Security 
Sector Reform, The Hague, 9-10 April 2008, para. 6. 
12 „Towards a Whole-of-Government Approach to Security System Reform‟ (2008), para. 12.  
13  „Towards a Whole-of-Government Approach to Security System Reform‟ (2008), paras. 
60-61.  
14  World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development (The 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank: Washington, 
DC, 2011), p. 107. 
15  WDR (2011), pp. 22-23, 171.  
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the way that reformers, and the donors who support them, seek to 
accomplish their goals.16 
1.2 Methodology and outline of the report 
This report seeks to provide an assessment of Norway‟s support to 
international SSR efforts to date, focusing primarily on the patterns of its 
engagement over the past three years. It seeks to identify existing capacities, 
the nature and scope of projects supported, and their perceived impact where 
possible. In concludes with recommendations based on the findings and on 
Norway's identified comparative advantages in supporting SSR. 
 
In describing the range and scope of Norway‟s contributions to SSR, the 
report will examine activities undertaken by each of the main governmental 
departments or institutional actors funded by Norway that engage in SSR. 
Although the study includes many of the countries in which Norway 
supports SSR projects, it is not a comprehensive study that includes all of the 
countries of engagement. Similarly, the study does not examine all of the 
SSR projects supported by Norway within those countries, but rather surveys 
a variety of projects based on a mix of objective and subjective criteria 
including functional area or institutional target of assistance, implementing 
agency, and perceived significance.  
 
The study also sought to outline the parameters of Norwegian spending in 
support of SSR. However, due to the decentralized nature of support to such 
projects across several government departments and funding streams, as well 
as ambiguities that resulted both from lack of clarity of some Norwegian 
actors regarding whether the projects constituted SSR, as well as from the 
way that projects were tagged in the MFA registry according to OECD DAC 
categories, it proved difficult to arrive at a conclusive overall figure of 
spending. We have included funding amounts towards certain key projects 
and country levels of spending generally to illustrate the scope of spending 
on SSR-related projects.   
 
Where possible, the study seeks to identify the impact and effectiveness of 
SSR projects. However, one limitation of the study is that, due to the limited 
time, resources and personnel, we were unable to directly survey the 
perceptions of the intended beneficiaries of most projects. Insights regarding 
assessments have consequently been drawn largely from pre-existing 
independent external reviews where these exist, along with the views of 
those who have been involved in authorising, implementing or overseeing 
SSR projects.  
 
The methodology of the study involved desk review of published research, 
government policy documents and other official statements as well as 
documentation on implementing bodies and funded by Norway. Specific 
project information and project evaluations, where available, were also 
reviewed. Semi-structured interviews were held with personnel from the 
MFA, MOD, POD, MOJ, and NORAD, with representatives from the United 
Nations in Geneva and New York, and with representatives of certain non-
                                                     
16  WDR (2011), p. 171.  
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governmental institutions that receive funding from Norway to implement 
SSR programmes.  
 
Finally, this study should not be construed as an evaluation of any of the 
SSR projects specifically mentioned. The interviews and project document 
reviews offered only a limited glimpse of each project and its context. A key 
objective of looking at various projects and settings was to derive lessons 
from these engagements for Norway‟s general approach in supporting SSR 
initiatives. 
 
Marina Caparini, Kari Marie Kjellstad, Trine Nikolaisen 24 
2. Survey of Norwegian Support to 
SSR 
2.1  Norwegian policy on SSR 
Although there is no single overarching Norwegian government statement 
explaining its definition of SSR or its objectives in supporting SSR, several 
relatively brief references to SSR have appeared in official documents and 
statements by Norwegian officials, which provide indications as to Norway‟s 
approach. Perhaps the most comprehensive statement affecting Norway‟s 
position on SSR appeared in Parliamentary Report Number 9 (2007–2008).17 
The report explains that SSR involves „a wide range of measures aimed at 
strengthening the security sector's legitimacy and effectiveness‟. SSR is 
„important both to strengthen and modernize the security sector as part of a 
democratization process, and as an element in the reconstruction of countries 
after a conflict has ended.‟ Further, Norway considers that „SSR is a 
prerequisite for stabilization and normalization. It is crucial for preventing 
gender-based violence.‟ The report goes on to note that ill-functioning 
security sectors undermine the legitimacy of state institutions, the possibility 
for peace and reconciliation, and economic and social development. Further, 
the Norwegian Government considers international assistance for security 
sector reform an important contribution to the prevention of conflict and 
complex humanitarian disasters. 
 
The Official Norwegian Report Coherent for Development underscores that 
Norway‟s approach to security sector reform mirrors that advanced by the 
OECD DAC, with the security sector broadly conceived as encompassing all 
key security institutions, the justice system, and the relevant security and 
justice management and oversight bodies (including formal state institutions 
and civil society organizations and the media). Further, Norway 
acknowledges that the security sector may also include informal (non-state) 
and traditional providers of security and justice.18  
 
Norway has prioritized SSR in its own priorities and through its support of 
international organizations.19 According to Parliamentary Report Number 9, 
Norway contributes to security sector reform both through bilateral projects 
and multilaterally. This may take the form of contributing funding, 
seconding staff, and cooperating with national authorities, and international 
and regional organizations like the UN, African Union, NATO, OSCE and 
EU.  
 
                                                     
17  Stortingsmelding nr.9. Norsk politikk for forebygging av humanitære katastrofer 
(Parliamentary Report Number 9. Norwegian Policy for the Prevention of Humanitarian 
Disasters). Available at: http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dok/regpubl/stmeld/2007-
2008/Stmeld-nr-9-2007-2008-/5.html?id=493424 
18  Norway, Coherent for development? How coherent Norwegian policies can assist 
development in poor countries, NOU, Official Norwegian Reports, 2008, No. 14, p. 163.  
19  Coherent for development? (2008), p. 163.  
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A core aspect of the Norwegian approach to SSR is the strong emphasis it 
places on supporting multilateral channels for assistance in SSR and in 
promoting international peace and security more generally: „Norway has 
sought to anchor its international engagement through an active membership 
role in international organizations, and by maintaining a broad international 
engagement to influence development of both policy and practice within the 
peace and security sector.‟20 This stems from its limited capacity as a small 
country and thus its fundamental interest in a strong rule-based international 
order.21 The prioritization of the multilateral approach was reasserted in the 
recent White Paper on foreign policy, according to which Norway supports 
the United Nations through its participation with personnel in peacekeeping 
operations, but also through its active support of efforts to strengthen the 
UN‟s ability to plan and conduct complex operations. In the multilateral 
setting, Norwegian support for SSR includes efforts to strengthen the 
capacity of international organizations for civilian crisis management, and in 
the case of the UN, integrated peace operations, which involve the 
coordination and cooperation of political, military, humanitarian and 
development actors. Security sector reform is a key area of Norwegian 
support to building UN operational capacities, in addition to strengthening 
African peace operation capacities and promoting the integration of a 
gender-sensitive perspective and efforts to combat sexual violence.22  
 
Norway‟s prioritization of multilateral engagements is reflected especially in 
the high level of support it provides to the United Nations, including the 
eleven agencies which are members of its inter-agency task force on SSR.23 
DPKO (specifically the Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions), 
UNDP (Crisis Prevention Bureau), DPA, and UNIFEM are the four lead 
agencies agencies in SSR, and their SSR-relevant activities are supported by 
Norway by various means. By way of illustration, Norway is one of the 
largest contributors to the UNDP, and provided NOK 770 million towards its 
core budget in 2008. In addition to core budget support, it provided NOK 60 
million towards its thematic fund for democratic governance and NOK 20 
million for its thematic fund for crisis prevention and recovery.24 It also 
funded the UNDP‟s Global Programme on Strengthening the Rule of Law in 
Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations with NOK 5 million in each of 2008 
and 2009.25 In addition to the support it provides to global programmes such 
as the UNDP‟s Rule of Law Programme, Norwegian embassies provide 
funding to UNDP country programmes.  
 
An important aspect of its strategic approach to SSR is the support Norway 
provides for the development of the UN‟s currently very limited institutional 
capacity to plan and implement SSR. Norway is one of four donors who has 
supported a project to develop a system-wide UN approach to SSR, a multi-
dimensional project that includes sensitization briefings across the UN to 
encourage the UN approach to SSR, the development of technical guidance 
                                                     
20  Coherent for development? (2008), p. 158.  
21  Coherent for development? (2008), p. 161.  
22 Norway, Interests, responsibilities and opportunities: central aspects of Norwegian foreign 
policy, Report to the Storting Number 15, 2008-2009, Recommendation from the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, adopted by government on 13 March 2009, Part 2, Section 12. 
23  The Inter-Agency Security Sector Reform Task Force includes the following UN 
agencies: DPKO, DPA, ODA, OHCHR, OSAA, PBSO, UNICEF, UNDP, UNIFEM and 
UNODC. The task force is chaired by DPKO. 
24  „UNDP og Norge‟, available at: http://www.undp.no/undp-og-norge/  
25  Ministry of Foreign Affairs registry. 
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notes on SSR, support to regional actors and regional consultations on SSR, 
development of a roster of international senior experts, plus the development 
of SSR knowledge and expertise of UN personnel through trainings and 
workshops, a knowledge management system, and the identification of 
lessons learned and best practices in SSR.26 Similarly Norway contributed to 
related initiatives to develop guidance for SSR-related activities such as the 
inter-agency „Rule-of-Law Indicators Project‟.27 Norway is also supporting 
the development of a strategic doctrinal framework and training activities for 
international police peacekeeping, including the contribution of police 
components to police reform and restructuring, as well as mentoring and 
monitoring. 
 
As a further element of its strategic approach to supporting the capacity of 
the UN and other multilateral actors in SSR, Norway funds NGOs and other 
organizations that assist the development of the UN, regional organizations, 
as well as the international donor community in SSR. One example is the 
International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), which has provided 
assistance to the UN SSR task force members in the drafting of SSR 
guidance notes and field-based research, and which aims to facilitate donor 
approaches and harmonization in SSR. 
 
Norway also contributes to UN capacity through its funding of Junior 
Professional Officer (JPO) positions in the various UN agencies, including 
notably in the area of security sector reform.  
 
While the multilateral-focused approach outlined above comprises Norway‟s 
strategic engagement on SSR, Norway also provides SSR assistance on a 
bilateral basis. Where possible, Norway seeks to have its smaller bilateral 
contributions support its multilateral engagements. The country surveys in 
Section 3 of this report illustrate the wide range of activities that are 
supported on a bilateral basis. 
 
Beyond the direct provision of monetary contributions, channels for 
Norwegian assistance to SSR may include sending Norwegian personnel 
from the armed forces, defence ministry, justice sector and police to train 
and mentor foreign counterparts, whether in  multilateral or bilateral settings. 
Norway also has several rosters for civilian experts in democracy building 
and human rights (NORDEM) and crisis response (NORCAP) who can be 
deployed abroad for SSR positions or projects (see below). Finally, 
Norwegian assistance may take the form of funding SSR-relevant projects 
developed by non-governmental actors without deploying personnel from 
Norwegian ministries or government agencies. Such projects include both 
those implemented by Norwegian and non-Norwegian NGOs and research 
institutions.  
 
Norway thus promotes SSR efforts in a variety of contexts and through 
diverse channels in support of democratization, stabilization, post-conflict 
reconstruction and conflict prevention. While various documents and 
policies provide general descriptions and explanations of policy aims, they 
                                                     
26  DPKO, „Developing a System-Wide United Nations Approach to Security Sector Reform: 
Phase One – Capacity-Building‟, Interim Report to Donors (May 2009-June 2010).  
27  See DPKO and OHCHR, The United Nations Rule of Law Indicators: Implementation 
Guide and Project Tools, First Edition (United Nations, 2011).  
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do not provide more planning guidance for SSR programming. To our 
knowledge, a specific set of guidelines for SSR-related programming has 
been produced only twice to date in Norway: in 2006 for defence sector 
reform programming in Serbia; and in 2010 when the jointly agreed MFA-
MOD guidelines were introduced for the Western Balkans region effective 
beginning 2011.  
 
Some grey areas appear to exist in how SSR is understood by Norwegian 
actors, including whether or not the activities they engage in constitute SSR, 
or simply police, justice or defence reform. For example, the term „defence-
related security sector reform‟ (DSSR) is commonly used in Norway, 
particularly among actors within the Norwegian defence sector. Some 
official documents and statements use the terms SSR and DSSR 
synonymously.28 In contrast, we found that police and justice system actors 
rarely referred to or framed support to police or justice system reform as 
SSR. Development actors tended to be more uncertain about what constitutes 
SSR, but typically took the position that their institution was generally not 
involved in SSR.  
2.2 Norwegian governmental context of SSR engagement 
Security sector reform covers several functional sectors, requiring a multi-
disciplinary approach. The division of roles and responsibilities among 
various departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and between 
at least four main institutional actors (MFA, Ministry of Defence, Ministry 
of Justice, and the Police Directorate) influences how SSR engagement takes 
place by Norway. The MFA occupies a key role in terms of setting the main 
lines of policy, budgeting, and coordinating. Programming to support SSR in 
a post-conflict country, for example, is served by at least four key 
departments or desks in the MFA, including the relevant regional 
programme plus the country desk, the UN desk, and the Department for 
International Security Policy. Funding for SSR-related projects in specific 
countries is provided through a number of grants managed by different units. 
The MFA, NORAD and the embassies manage budget lines. The MOD has a 
small budget line for DSSR, but also receives MFA funding for DSSR 
projects which are ODA-eligible. The MOJ does not have a separate budget 
line, but is a recipient of MFA funding for conducting SSR projects. In other 
words Norway is involved through multiple institutional vectors funded 
through a complex mix of budget stream, over which the MFA maintains a 
central position.  
 
Norway maintains several pools of civilian experts who can be deployed on 
a range of civilian crisis management and peacebuilding missions, 
channelled via the UN, EU, OSCE, as well as on a bilateral basis. Norway 
employs these pools to fill personnel needs in the areas of police and judicial 
reform, defence management, as well as other areas such as elections 
monitoring, human rights monitoring, rule of law strengthening, 
humanitarian relief, etc. These pools include several located within the 
executive branch: CIVPOL with the Norwegian Police; the Ministry of 
Justice‟s Rule of Law Pool of Experts (Styrkebrønnen); and the defence SSR 
pool in the Ministry of Defence. Other rosters include NORDEM (the 
                                                     
28  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006, „Serbia. Support to SSR‟. 
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Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights), hosted at the 
Norwegian Centre for Human Rights in the Faculty of Law, University of 
Oslo, which fields experts in human rights and democratization, electoral 
observers; and NORCAP (Norwegian Capacity), a roster for humanitarian 
disaster response personnel run by the Norwegian Refugee Council. All of 
these pools are funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but through 
different budget lines. While Norway has actively employed its civilian 
pools to contribute to international crisis management and peacebuilding 
tasks including SSR, those pools drawn from government institutions (POD, 
Styrkebrønnen, MOD) face an inherent tension in priorities because the 
primary responsibility for those civilian experts is to conduct tasks in the 
domestic context. Police officers, judges, civilian personnel who work in 
defence ministries and other civil service institutions are primarily employed 
for domestic needs, and deployment of personnel on international missions, 
especially of senior and highly specialised staff, may create shortages back 
at the ministry. In contrast, conducting international operations is inherent to 
the military. Nevertheless, the armed forces may encounter its own set of 
difficulties due to overstretched capacities and budgetary constraints due to 
the costs of sustained deployment.  
 
As will be discussed below, the extent of Norwegian involvement in SSR – 
both in terms of funding that Norway has been willing to provide for SSR-
related projects and the range of personnel it has provided to train, mentor 
and advise counterparts in countries undergoing SSR – reveals Norway as a 
generous and consistent donor that has made significant contributions to 
SSR efforts in various countries. On the other hand, Norway‟s strength as a 
donor is mitigated somewhat by the extent to which the development and 
implementation of SSR projects are decentralised. Decentralization appears 
to account for some problems in coordination and in keeping different actors 
informed about the various initiatives Norway supports. This 
decentralization also makes it difficult to arrive at a total overview of 
Norway‟s SSR-related engagements, impeding the visibility of its support to 
SSR. This duality, in which Norway is an important actor in various areas 
where SSR is taking place, but tends to lack a clear or central focus and little 
visible coordination between contributions to functional sectors, is a 
characteristic of the Norwegian engagement with SSR to date. 
 
Several people we interviewed mentioned incidentally discovering 
information about other SSR projects funded by Norway that were taking 
place in the same country, whether in another functional area of the security 
sector, or occasionally within the same sector that s/he was working. This 
was attributed by some to the decentralised system and sometimes to the 
lack of transparency of the system by which SSR projects are developed and 
supported. Some improvements had been noted, but there was still need for a 
more systematised process of information-sharing on SSR.  
 
While the decentralised nature of SSR engagement could be mitigated to 
some extent by good information flows between relevant actors, we found 
that this is not always the case. Although the Norwegian departments 
involved in funding or implementing SSR activities are relatively small and 
this was seen by several respondents as an advantage in facilitating informal 
communication and information-exchange, we heard of several breakdowns 
in communication. For example, one MFA regional department was unaware 
A Stocktaking of Norwegian Engagement in Security Sector Reform 29 
of certain SSR programmes being run by the MOD in the region concerned. 
MOD staff involved in training or mentoring programmes who were 
unaware of other SSR projects being funded or run by Norway in the 
country, or policing projects that were approved and funded by the MFA 
without first consulting with POD.  
 
Anecdotally we heard that on the ground, Norwegians working on different 
SSR projects often encounter their peers inadvertently and exchange 
information on an informal basis. While emerging good practice for donors 
argues for coordination and inter-agency cooperation in the development of 
effective SSR support, this does not appear to be occurring consistently with 
Norwegian assistance provided by various actors to SSR within the same 
country. This suggests that there is a need for a more systematised approach 
to exchanging information on SSR projects being undertaken by Norwegian 
government actors in different functional sectors.   
 
Beyond problems in communication, it could be argued that the rather 
fragmented Norwegian approach stems from the lack of a centralised, cross-
governmental coordinating mechanism on SSR. This appears to sustain a 
„silo‟ effect in which initiatives are developed within each functional sector, 
but with little effort to better understand and, where possible, link initiatives 
across related sectors. Developing a more coherent approach would possibly 
reduce the flexibility which currently characterises the Norwegian approach. 
However, it would likely improve the benefits to the recipient country since 
initiatives would be based on a more comprehensive understanding of the 
challenges encountered in the security and justice systems and more efficient 
use of resources that Norway could bring to bear in supporting their reform.  
2.3 Geographical pattern of Norwegian engagement in SSR 
Norway is widely engaged in SSR, particularly in regions and countries 
where it has strong foreign policy interests. In defence-related SSR, 
Norwegian engagement in the Western Balkans is strongly anchored in its 
identity as a member of NATO and in defence cooperation under the NATO 
umbrella. Thus, for defence-related SSR, the Western Balkans, especially 
Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo and Montenegro, have 
constituted a primary region of focus for several years, and this is expected 
to continue for several more. A second region in focus for Norway is the 
West Caucasus, firstly Georgia, but increasingly also Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. According to interviewees, the focus on the Western Balkans 
and West Caucasus is linked to the fact that these are not presently NATO 
members, but are countries in which NATO takes an interest and with which 
NATO has developed institutionalised relationships accompanied by the 
prospect of eventual membership. Norway‟s oil interests may also underpin 
foreign policy interest in the West Caucasus. Beyond Europe the other area 
of foreign policy interest where SSR engagement can similarly be argued to 
be NATO-related is the Norwegian engagement in Afghanistan. (See the 
section „Afghanistan‟ below.) Several respondents predicted that in the 
future Norway will engage more in Africa over the long-term, likely 
concentrating initially on Anglophone African countries including Southern 
Sudan among others.  
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Police assignment to international assignments is more dispersed and tends 
to reflect Norway‟s support for multilateral peacekeeping operations and 
Afghanistan. Norway also supports bilateral police projects in countries 
where it has foreign policy interests.  
 
Formal judicial sector reform initiatives have been supported by deployment 
of Rule of Law Pool experts to European contexts – notably through team 
deployments to Georgia and Moldova, but also individuals deployed in 
multilateral and bilateral contexts. Beyond Europe, individual prison 
advisors have been deployed to Liberia. A team of advisors were deployed to 
Kabul to support the counter-narcotics prosecution and court, while prison 
advisors were deployed to Meymaneh (see below „Afghanistan‟).   
 
While the link between SSR support and foreign policy is especially clear in 
countries that are focal points for Norway, engagement in SSR elsewhere 
has something of an ad hoc character and tends to be in „bits and pieces‟ in 
places where it does engage. This may be a result of the widely noted 
flexibility and desire to be responsive to opportunities and conditions on the 
ground. However it may also result from the decentralised and sectorally-
driven patterns of engagement, weak or informal coordinating mechanisms, 
and the absence of a strong holistically focused understanding and approach 
to SSR. 
 
The big budgets within the MFA, including for SSR-related projects, are 
administered by the regional programmes in the MFA, and on the ground by 
the Norwegian Embassy. Collecting data on funding for SSR-related projects 
by country encountered numerous problems relating to the way in which the 
project was classified in MFA reporting and registry database entry, a 
system that is based on OECD DAC project codes. Under the general 
category 152, entitled „conflict prevention and resolution, peace and 
security‟, are several subcategories relevant to SSR. A specific sub-category 
(15210) exists for „security system management and reform‟, while others 
include „civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution‟ (15220), 
„participation in international peacekeeping operations‟ (15230), 
„reintegration and SALW control‟ (15240), „removal of landmines and 
explosive remnants of war‟ (15250), and „Child soldiers (prevention and 
demobilization)‟ (15260). However, while some may be relevant to SSR, not 
all projects listed under the 152 category necessarily constitute SSR. Further, 
activities that fall under general category 151, for „government and civil 
society‟, may constitute SSR, such as activities in the sub-category „legal 
and judicial development‟. However, those using DAC codes are advised to 
use the 152xx codes for 151 category activities „that are primarily aimed at 
supporting security system reform or undertaken in connection with post-
conflict and peacebuilding activities‟.29 This system of project coding 
introduces inconsistency and ambiguity, and it is not evident from the 
database outputs that all SSR-relevant activities were coded as such. Some 
DAC categories involve SSR, but are not listed as SSR, making it 
challenging to extract reliable data on SSR projects and funding on the basis 
of codes alone. In practical terms, since the MFA database which contains 
records on funded projects and programmes does not include a specific tab 
that would cover all dimensions of security sector reform, efforts to generate 
                                                     
29  OECD Defence Cooperation Directorate, „CRS Purpose Codes, taking effect in 2011 
reporting on 2010 flows‟, p. 7.  
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data about SSR-related projects must rely on multiple overlapping searches 
conducted using search terms that cover various possible types of projects, 
such as „security‟, „reconciliation‟ or „armed‟. 
 
Furthermore, we heard that in the past, some embassies tended not to view 
the projects they have administered as SSR, even though these involved 
projects in DDR, police reform, justice sector reform, etc. This suggests that 
divergent understandings and definitions of SSR emerged in the absence of a 
guidance note or policy on SSR. Additionally, some multi-donor trust funds 
were apparently too broad to be captured by the database as SSR, although 
they provided significant support to SSR-relevant activities.  
2.4 Norway’s approach to projects and programming in SSR 
The absence of programming guidance or strategy on SSR, with the 
exception of the recent strategic guidelines for the Western Balkans, appears 
to have had several effects. Embassies and MFA country desk officers 
support projects directly through funding and maintain a broad overview of 
engagement. Actors within each functional sector – i.e. within the defence, 
police, and justice sectors largely determine how SSR projects have tended 
to be initiated, developed and implemented. Actors tend to enjoy a 
significant degree of flexibility regarding which SSR projects to advance or 
support and how they support them. The ability to react quickly to needs and 
developments on the ground was repeatedly held up as an advantage for 
Norway, particularly when compared to other donors who faced more rigid 
planning and project development requirements.  
 
However a high degree of flexibility may not work in the interest of 
beneficiaries over the long-term. While flexibility enables Norway to 
respond quickly to requests, it also implies looser planning and coordination. 
A more coordinated, strategic approach would likely reduce flexibility to 
some extent, but would also enable better use of resources through planned 
synergies and ultimately a stronger impact. Such an approach would require 
more leadership within the MFA and especially from regional departments.   
 
Nevertheless, Norwegian support to SSR reflects other elements of good 
practice, and with a few exceptions, appears to have demonstrated relevance, 
impact and effectiveness. Norway prioritizes involvement in multilateral 
projects which enable having a bigger impact. This has been achieved, for 
example, in successful projects such as the NATO Trust Fund for the 
reintegration of demobilised military personnel in Bosnia.30 Norway also 
supports Nordic and Nordic-Baltic initiatives, and seeks to use these 
initiatives to demonstrate the value of developing regional approaches to 
beneficiary countries in the Western Balkans region, although we found less 
evidence of Nordic and Baltic initiatives in SSR than expected.  
 
Norway also provides much development assistance generally through a 
modality called the „Norwegian model‟, which entails channelling funding 
and project implementation through Norwegian non-governmental 
organizations, private and public sector actors. This is efficient insofar as 
                                                     
30  Prism Research, „Independent Final Evaluation of the NATO/PfP Trust Fund (NTF) 
Programme for Assistance to Redundant Military Personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina‟, 
October 2009.  
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these are familiar and trusted partners whose use entails a lower risk of 
corruption. However the model raises questions about local ownership, 
capacity building and sustainability over the long-term in the absence of a 
strategy to progressively hand off responsibility for implementation to local 
actors.  
 
Similarly, certain non-Norwegian actors are heavily relied upon by Oslo to 
develop and implement projects in certain areas and regions. These include 
International Management Group (IMG), an entity that has the status of an 
international organization yet which works on a consultancy basis. Similarly, 
Norway funds numerous projects of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic 
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), which has a hybrid structure 
encompassing an identity as an intergovernmental organization with member 
states including Norway participating in a governing structure called the 
Foundation Council, and as a non-governmental organization which also 
takes on consultancies. Both IMG and DCAF are perceived as trusted and 
competent partners, and receive significant amounts of funding from 
Norway to implement SSR-relevant projects.  
 
This reliance on implementing partners such as IMG and DCAF has been 
justified by some respondents within the Norwegian MFA on the grounds 
that they are easy to work with and generally can be trusted to do good work. 
Departments that have relatively few staff for handling many countries or 
that are responsible for a broad brief appear to be particularly prone to 
relying on such implementing partners. Such partners do the heavy lifting of 
conceptualising projects, implementing or administering them, and reporting 
on the outcomes. Norway provides funding, and is able in the end to attach 
its name to the outcome or output.  
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3. Norway’s approach to SSR by 
functional sector 
This section examines Norwegian contributions to SSR by functional sector 
– i.e., in the defence, policing and justice sectors. These typically constitute a 
mix of multilateral and bilateral projects, although the latter tend to be 
emphasized in this section. This is due to our reliance on information 
gleaned from interviews conducted with mostly Oslo-based subjects.   
3.1 Defence-related security sector reform (‘DSSR’) 
For the purpose of this report, the defence sector is defined as the uniformed 
military, and the military and civilian management, accountability and 
oversight systems that sustain it. The term defence-related security sector 
reform (DSSR) is commonly used in the MOD to refer to SSR-related 
projects that involve the armed forces, defence management, and the 
development and implementation of defence policy, and this report will 
follow that practice. DSSR projects are carried out in multilateral and 
bilateral frameworks. In the Western Balkans, which constitutes a primary 
region of Norwegian DSSR efforts, contributions to multilateral settings 
have entailed, for example, financial contributions to NATO trust funds for 
reintegration and resettlement of redundant military personnel, provision of 
military training or mentoring to Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries, and 
financial support to regional organizations dealing with politico-military 
issues such as the Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation 
Assistance Centre (RACVIAC). Bilateral DSSR projects are implemented 
mainly by the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the Norwegian Defence 
Academy (NDUC), and the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment 
(FFI). The strategic purpose of Norwegian engagement with DSSR is to 
support Norwegian security and foreign policy objectives. According to the 
MOD, DSSR has been undertaken to help strengthen the democratic control 
of armed forces of fragile and post-conflict states, and to help build 
interoperability and thus the capacity of such states to participate in 
international peacekeeping operations.31  
 
Since 2007, the Norwegian Ministry of Defence has maintained a pool of 
experienced MOD personnel who are prepared to offer advice on capacity 
building, democratic and civilian control of armed forces, defence ministry 
administration, security policy formulation, operations and long-term 
planning, budgeting and policy implementation. Members of the pool have 
been trained in basic SSR principles and best practices.32 In 2009 up to 75 
                                                     
31  St.meld. nr. 15 (2008-2009) Interesser, ansvar og muligheter Hovedlinjer i norsk 
utenrikspolitikk (Report to Parliament Number 15, 2008-2009, Interests, responsibilities 
and opportunities: the main lines of Norwegian foreign policy), p. 102. Available at: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dok/regpubl/stmeld/2008-2009/stmeld-nr-15-2008-
2009-.html?id=548673,  
32  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, „Norway‟s deployable civilian crisis management capacities‟, 
September 2009 (EDS-GSA).  
Marina Caparini, Kari Marie Kjellstad, Trine Nikolaisen 34 
personnel were available for assignments, whether in bilateral or multilateral 
contexts such as the UN or NATO.33 
 
Norway supports defence sector reform through two funding channels: those 
activities and projects that are eligible to be classified as official 
development assistance (ODA), and those activities that are ineligible to be 
considered ODA. The guidelines for which types of activities are clearly set 
out by OECD DAC, and are generally based on whether or not the activity 
concerned is intended to promote the economic development and welfare of 
developing countries as its main objective.34  
 
Activities that count as ODA include support to security system management 
and reform, such as technical cooperation to improve civilian oversight and 
democratic control of security sector institutions, and oversight of military 
budgets.35 Certain other peacebuilding and security-related activities also 
qualify as ODA, such as the repatriation and demobilization of armed 
factions and disposal of their weapons, the reintegration of demobilized 
military personnel into the economy, mine clearance, and technical 
cooperation to control, prevent or reduce the proliferation of small arms and 
light weapons (SALW).36  
 
The financing of military equipment and services, including the training of 
military personnel, even in non-military areas such as civil engineering or 
human rights law, generally does not qualify as ODA.37 These types of 
military assistance activities are funded directly from the MOD budget. 
 
In 2010 the Norwegian Ministry of Defence‟s budget for SSR activities was 
approximately 45 million NOK. The majority of that amount was provided 
by the MFA because, although the MOD was implementing the relevant 
projects, most of those projects were deemed ODA-eligible. About 18.3 
million NOK for DSSR came from the MOD‟s own budget in 2010.  
 
A significant development in the coordination of Norway‟s approach to SSR 
was the elaboration of the DSSR Common Strategy 2010-14 for the Western 
Balkans. In this document, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry 
of Defence set out their common understanding of the broader objectives, 
the need for clearer geographical and functional priorities, the need for close 
coordination to ensure consistent objectives and complementary measures, 
and agreement on the basis for cost-sharing between the MOD and MFA 
regarding DSSR projects in the Western Balkans. Serbia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Macedonia were agreed to be given special priority, as well 
as regional initiatives – i.e. those involving the cooperation of two or more 
of the countries in the region. Priority functional areas were identified to be, 
first, strengthening democratic governance and civilian control of the armed 
forces, including strengthening administrative capacity in ministries of 
defence, parliamentary oversight, civil society expertise and capacity to 
scrutinize the defence sector, and integrating gender perspectives into the 
governance of defence and security. Engagement in these activities would be 
                                                     
33  „Norwegian Crisis Response Pool (NORPOOL) – Training‟, October 09.  
34  OECD DAC, DAC Statistical Reporting Directives, DCD/DAC(2010)40/REV1, 12 
November 2010, para 37.  
35  DAC Statistical Reporting Directives (2010), p. 13. 
36  DAC Statistical Reporting Directives (2010), p. 14.  
37  DAC Statistical Reporting Directives (2010), para. 42. 
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largely financed from the MFA‟s budget. Second, the common strategy 
identifies the priority of military cooperation, including training military 
personnel and support to reforming military education to facilitate proper 
exercise of authority and participation in international peace operations, to 
be financed largely by the MOD. And third, the common strategy recognizes 
as a priority area of engagement activities which integrate SSR in 
peacebuilding in the region. Such activities may include support for 
retraining and reintegrating redundant military personnel, small arms 
control, and support for the implementation of conventions banning mines 
and cluster munitions. These activities would be financed largely through the 
MFA. 
 
A DSSR unit was established in January 2010 at the Norwegian Defence 
University College (NDUC) as part of the Norwegian Defence International 
Centre (NODEFIC). With a staff of three, the DSSR unit is the executing 
and supporting unit of Norway‟s support for DSSR projects abroad.38 It is 
responsible for coordinating all operational-level DSSR activity and also 
operates as a think tank in developing ideas for new projects in defence-
related SSR at the operational level.  
 
Examples of capacity-building projects in defence governance supported by 
Norway include mentoring and assistance provided to Montenegro to 
establish a defence ministry for the newly independent state, and in Serbia 
training and mentoring civilian defence ministry personnel in defence 
planning and budgeting. Defence sector assistance may also be aimed at 
integrating the security sector into post-conflict peacebuilding efforts. These 
efforts may include restructuring of the defence sector, retraining and 
resettlement of redundant military personnel, and demining, and are 
generally ODA-eligible. In this vein, Norway has supported retraining and 
resettlement of demobilised soldiers in Serbia and Bosnia through 
contributions to multilateral trust funds.  
 
In addition to strengthening defence governance capacities, Norway‟s 
defence sector assistance may be aimed at building military capacities and 
enhancing military cooperation – i.e., increasing the recipient country‟s 
ability to participate in international operations through training, education 
of personnel, and support to developing key security institutions including 
the armed forces  and the coast guard. To this end, Norway has, for example, 
contributed field hospitals to the Serbian armed forces, and is currently 
contributing the same to Macedonia, facilitating military medical 
cooperation between Norway and these countries in the context of 
international missions. Norway has also promoted regional cooperation in 
the development of coast guard capacities in the Adriatic Sea. Military 
cooperation-focused activities are predominantly funded and implemented 
by the MOD.    
 
Finally, support to defence sector reform may include the training and 
mentoring of military forces, such as is being done in Afghanistan by 
Norwegian armed forces personnel (see Parliamentary Report Number 9, 
and „Afghanistan‟ below). These types of activities do not qualify as ODA, 
and are funded exclusively by the MOD.  
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Several respondents noted that under the current circumstances Norway does 
not have sufficient military resources to contribute to peace operations, and 
hence the forms of assistance listed above have become important alternative 
means of supporting international peacebuilding. For Norway, as a small 
state, providing SSR assistance is also less costly than military participation 
in international peacekeeping missions. As Norwegian armed forces have 
been under strain in recent years as a result of deployment to international 
peacekeeping operations and multilateral interventions in Afghanistan and 
most recently Libya, there is likely to be an increased focus on defence-
related security sector reform as a means for Norway to contribute to 
peacebuilding and international security without further deploying troops.  
 
DSSR projects were described in interviews as „demand-driven‟, i.e. 
generated by local needs, often as relayed by Norwegian defence attachés. 
DSSR is facilitated by strong traditions of international military cooperation, 
while the range of actors who are brought into it and play various roles, 
include active service military personnel, defence ministry staff, and 
researchers at NDUC and FFI.  
 
The geographic focus of Norwegian DSSR assistance has shifted, reflecting 
progress made in democratization and integration into Euro-Atlantic 
structures. In the 1990s the Baltic countries were a priority region, followed 
subsequently by the Western Balkans as the primary geographical focus of 
Norwegian assistance to DSSR. In recent years Norway has discontinued its 
DSSR assistance to new NATO member states Croatia and Albania, while 
Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo will continue to 
receive Norwegian DSSR assistance for several years. As noted to be the 
case with Norway‟s support to SSR generally, attention in DSSR is shifting 
towards the West Caucasus, and engagement in Africa is expected to 
increase over the long-term.  
 
Norway‟s prioritization of multilateralism is reflected in its support for 
regional approaches through Nordic and Nordic-Baltic cooperation. 
Cooperation with partners is a repeated theme in Norwegian foreign policy 
and issues relevant to SSR, and cooperation on Western Balkan defence 
reform assistance projects was agreed in 2004 by Nordic defence ministers. 
The Nordic-Baltic initiative has been a framework for DSSR projects in 
Ukraine, Georgia and the Western Balkans. Nordic cooperation has been 
valued for demonstrating how effective cooperation can be forged in a 
region among countries with different affiliations, as illustrated by the 
Nordic and Baltic states‟ different patterns of membership in NATO and the 
EU – Norway being a member of NATO but not the EU, while Sweden is a 
member of the EU but not NATO, Denmark being a member of both 
organizations, etc. This emphasis on regional cooperation is particularly 
relevant for states in the Western Balkans, who similarly have different 
patterns of membership in NATO and are at different stages of progress 
towards membership of the EU.  
 
However, respondents have suggested that while there are some success 
stories, cooperation is often difficult to achieve in practice. Nordic 
cooperation is not always easily achieved due to structural factors such as 
different organizational arrangements, military assistance procedures and 
funding systems by which military assistance is delivered. For example, 
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Norway‟s embassies are allotted discretionary funds which, while relatively 
modest, enable them to react flexibly and quickly to new requirements and 
initiatives. In contrast, certain other Nordic states have strongly centralized 
systems which involve time-consuming processes requiring inter-
departmental consultations and the participation of top-level decision-
makers. Nordic states may also have different national interests or shifting 
priorities for engagement, including withdrawing support from certain 
geographic regions in which Norway remains engaged. Denmark, for 
instance, is reportedly shifting more attention towards East Africa, while 
Norway will remain focused on the Western Balkans for the next few years.  
 
For some interview subjects, the defence sector was seen as particularly 
amenable to the type of training, mentoring and knowledge transfer 
embodied by SSR projects. These respondents also acknowledged that while 
the training and planning tools are, on one level, simply technical 
instruments, the processes in which they are embedded, such as defence 
planning and budgeting, ultimately have political consequences. Thus, 
potential political implications are often the main obstacles to implementing 
difficult decisions in defence reform. For example, unsustainably high 
defence costs would often entail making difficult decisions that would 
reduce defence structures, close bases and result in higher unemployment 
over the short term. Nevertheless, cooperating on a seemingly technical level 
was also viewed as an effective means of socialization or imbuing of norms, 
such as principles of democratic civilian control and oversight, transparency, 
accountability, etc. Effecting value change was acknowledged to be a long-
term process, and technical cooperation through a sustained teaching and 
mentoring process was seen as more effective in changing values over the 
long term than lecturing on democratic norms and values or providing 
equipment and other material resources.   
 
There also emerged from our interviews the perception that the Norwegian 
public is generally not well aware of what Norway is doing in terms of SSR. 
The public relations aspect of Norwegian involvement in SSR has been weak 
in terms of informing the domestic public about what is being done and why. 
It also emerged that there are differences within the military itself regarding 
SSR. One observer noted a lack of understanding among some of the 
uniformed military about SSR, including the view especially among 
Afghanistan experienced officers that SSR is not what the military should be 
doing. Nevertheless, a view commonly expounded among those interviewed, 
and particularly those from the defence sector, was that in the future 
Norwegian contributions to international peace and security in contexts such 
as Afghanistan are less and less likely to take the form of costly combat 
units, and are more likely to take alternative forms such as contributions to 
SSR processes. For a small state such as Norway, SSR is a less expensive 
way to provide defence and security assistance, and is a more effective 
means of exporting „soft power‟, i.e., promoting Norway‟s values, culture, 
institutions and policies.  
 
According to several interview subjects, Norwegian assistance to DSSR 
processes has two primary audiences: the direct beneficiaries of DSSR 
projects and Norway‟s allies. First, and most self-evidently, DSSR projects 
support the transitional and democratization processes in receiving countries 
in the specific area of defence and security institutions and processes. Such 
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activities are of clear benefit to recipient countries. But Norwegian DSSR 
support is also undertaken with other partners in mind, in particular NATO 
member states. While considered as having low public visibility among the 
domestic public, several respondents felt that Norway‟s DSSR activities are 
appreciated by Norway‟s allies, and particularly its larger allies. Through 
support to DSSR including the strengthening of military-to-military 
relationships, Norway helps to export values such as democratic control and 
accountability, encourages professionalization, fill in gaps of assistance 
provided to countries, and helps to normalize relations involving transitional 
countries.  
 
Thus, while Norwegian support to defence-related SSR does not appear to be 
well understood or appreciated by the domestic public, many of those 
involved in developing such programmes in Norway and in partner countries 
consider them as contributing to democratization and peacebuilding 
processes in transitional states. Improving defence and security governance 
capacities is a major focus of Norwegian DSSR support, but benefit is also 
derived from supporting professionalization and capacity-building of states 
to contribute to international peacekeeping operations. Support to defence-
related security sector reform further constitutes an instrument for 
Norwegian foreign policy at a time when demands outstrip its personnel and 
resource capacities for military deployments in support of peacekeeping 
operations. The tradition of military-to-military cooperation, the 
peacebuilding and democracy building objectives served by DSSR, and its 
foreign policy benefits suggest that DSSR will continue to be a valued 
instrument in Norwegian foreign policy. This is facilitated by the 
institutionalization of DSSR through certain structures and processes, 
namely the DSSR unit at NDUC and the elaboration of a joint MFA-MOD 
strategy for DSSR in the Western Balkans.  
3.2 Police  
The Norwegian position on support for SSR through contributions to police 
reform is defined by various documents, including the „Political platform as 
basis for the Government‟s work‟ (Soria Moria Declaration), the 
Government declaration, the national budget, reports to the Storting, 
declarations, speeches and articles from the ministers of the MFA and 
NORAD.  
 
According to Parliamentary Report Number 9 (2007–2008), Norwegian 
assistance to police reform occurs primarily, although not exclusively, 
through the deployment of Norwegian police in international peacekeeping 
missions. Support to police reform is also provided via bilateral programmes 
and through Norway‟s strategic-level support to the development of the 
UN‟s capacities in SSR, including its police reform component.  
 
Between 2008-2010 the MFA granted approximately NOK 284.8 million to 
police reform efforts implemented by the Police Directorate (POD). There is 
a close link between the Foreign Ministry and the Police Directorate, and the 
MFA finances all of the Norwegian police contributions to SSR. Support for 
police training in routine civil policing functions qualifies as ODA.39 
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Similarly, peacekeeping expenditures within a UN context for activities such 
as monitoring or retraining of civil administrators and police forces, or 
training in customs and border control procedures, are ODA eligible.40  
 
Since 1989 the Norwegian police have participated in 38 missions in 24 
different countries. UN operations are priority for Norway, which over the 
last few years has been involved in missions such as UNMIK (Kosovo), 
MINUSTAH (Haiti), UNMIL (Liberia), MINURCAT (Chad), UNMIS 
(Sudan) and UNAMID (Darfur). Norwegian police also participate in other 
multilateral operations, such as those run by the EU and OSCE, primarily in 
the Western Balkans. The established limit of police personnel who can be 
deployed internationally is one percent of the operational Norwegian police 
force. Currently, about 80-90 personnel in Norway‟s „CIVPOL‟ pool, or 
police available for deployment on UN missions and international 
assignments, can be deployed at any one time.   
 
The use of Norwegian police abroad today follows a strategy that prioritizes 
supporting UN operations and frameworks. Norway also has a strongly 
proclaimed policy to fight gender-based violence, protect women and 
children and increase female voice and participation in security structures 
and governance. To that end, Norway developed in 2006 a strategic plan for 
implementing UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1325, which was 
updated in 2011 to incorporate SCR1820 for its engagement in conflict-
affected regions, with the document Women, peace and security (Kvinner, 
fred og sikkerhet 2011-2013). 
 
Norway, like other countries, is unable to request specific positions in the 
multilateral operations in which it participates. The Police Directorate (POD) 
has consequently developed its own strategy for how best to make an impact 
and to exert Norwegian influence. By international standards Norwegian 
police officers are well educated and have significant expertise. The POD 
maintains a thorough selection process for international deployments and 
will only send highly and appropriately qualified police officers abroad. 
According to the former Chief of Police in Norway, Ingelin Killingren,41 in 
cooperating with the MFA, the Norwegian police will only send officers to 
places where it is expected that they will have something to contribute.  
 
The Police Directorate seeks to follow the strategic plan Women, peace and 
security, and strive to send a fairly high number of female police officers. 
The Police Directorate thus also puts considerable effort into recruiting 
female police officers for international peace operations. 
 
The duties of police on deployment varies according to each operation and 
the mandate that it is implementing, but deployed police generally engage in 
three types of activities: advice/mentoring, education and training, and 
operational police work. The Police Directorate notes that while there is still 
a need for generalists, the increasing complexity of international operations 
is resulting in the growing need for expertise in a variety of areas such as 
governance, education, investigations, project work, drugs, organized crime, 
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criminal intelligence, financial crime, institution building and police reform, 
terrorism, etc.42  
 
For example, the qualifications that are needed for police deployed in 
Liberia currently include expertise in police management and investigation 
of cases of sexual abuse; in Kosovo expertise in intelligence, war crimes, 
financial crime, and forensics is needed; in Serbia expertise in senior 
management, counter-narcotics and police training is required; and for 
Afghanistan expertise in management and human rights training, coaching 
women‟s strategic leadership, operational policing and counter-narcotics 
have been identified as key themes. Whether in multilateral or bilateral 
contexts, POD attempts to meet the local needs with appropriately 
experienced police. The most recent operation that Norway has participated 
in is MINUSTAH in Haiti. As it is a French speaking operation, Norway is 
providing French language lessons to its personnel in order to facilitate their 
participation.  
 
While the police contribution to multilateral peace operations is the most 
visible way that the Norwegian police contribute to SSR, the Norwegian 
government also contributes to police reform in other areas in which it funds 
programmes. Support to police reform through bilateral programmes has 
been especially notable in Serbia, where the JuNo series of assistance 
projects managed by POD has since 2002 supported activities such as the 
equipping of criminal labs and the development of problem-oriented 
community policing. Additionally, MFA funding through OSCE has 
supported a range of projects including enhancing the Serbian MOI‟s war 
crimes investigation capacity, strengthening its crime scene and forensic 
investigations capacity, and strengthening community policing in South 
Serbia, and MFA funding through International Management Group has 
supported the development of a basic police training centre in Sremska 
Kamenica. (see „Serbia‟ below for more details).  
 
Finally, Norway offers strategic support for the police component of SSR 
through the advice and inputs of its police adviser at the UN mission and the 
support it provides to the SSR Unit and the development of a UN-wide 
approach to SSR. As SSR has become a common component in UN Security 
Council peacekeeping mission mandates, Norway‟s financial support for 
activities such as the development of a strategic doctrinal framework for 
international police peacekeeping has far-reaching potential impact for host 
countries and countries, like Norway, that contribute police to peacekeeping 
operations.  
3.3 Justice sector  
The Judicial Crisis Response Pool, also known as the Rule of Law Pool of 
Advisors (Styrkebrønnen) has existed since late 2003 as one of the main 
mechanisms for Norway to implement justice sector reform. The Rule of 
Law Pool is maintained and coordinated by the Ministry of Justice, and is 
funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For the period 2008-2010, this 
funding amounted to approximately NOK 81 million.43 By 2011 the Pool 
                                                     
42  https://www.politi.no/om_politiet/internasjonalt_samarbeid/internasjonale_operasjoner/ 
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consisted of some 100 experienced, pre-selected judges, public prosecutors, 
military prosecutors, police prosecutors, defence attorneys and prison and 
probation advisers who are available for rapid deployment, whether in 
international civil crisis management operations or in bilateral cooperation 
and assistance programmes to support justice sector reform.44 According to 
the Justice Ministry, the Rule of Law Pool, together with the deployment of 
Norwegian civilian police, provides Norway with the capacity to field expert 
advice and assistance on rebuilding or reforming every aspect of the criminal 
justice system in countries emerging from conflict or authoritarian rule. Past 
deployments have provided advisors specifically on developing an 
independent judiciary, training in and application of international human 
rights law, and the administration of justice in areas under administration by 
the international community.  
 
Members of the Rule of Law Pool agree to a two-year commitment during 
which they may be sent, with prior approval of Norwegian authorities, on an 
individual assignment or as members of a team in part of a larger 
programme. At any point, up to one-half of the pool may be deployed on 
assignment.  
 
Styrkebrønnen was originally conceived by the MFA and MOJ for 
deployment in multilateral settings. However the UN and other multilateral 
organizations typically are not used to having teams deployed and usually 
accept only individual deployments from member states due to the political 
sensitivities about the distribution of posts among member states: team 
deployments in multilateral contexts would suggest an overconcentration of 
influence from a single country. Accordingly, bilateral cooperation projects 
became the context of choice for Styrkebrønnen because of their greater 
feasibility for deploying a team of advisers who could cover most of the 
links in the „chain of justice‟ – i.e., the various inter-related components of 
the criminal justice system. While individual secondments to multilateral 
settings can and do take place, the strength of the Rule of Law Pool is, in 
their view, the holistic approach they offer for addressing almost every part 
of the „chain of justice‟ through the deployment of teams in bilateral 
contexts. Norway is believed to be the only country that maintains such a 
capability.   
 
In theory, the capacity of the Rule of Law Pool to address the „chain of 
justice‟ in a holistic manner owes in part to the fact that both justice and 
police are located under one ministry in Norway. In contrast, many other 
countries have both a justice ministry and ministry of the interior, which may 
explain the tendency to focus mostly on police and less on other parts of the 
criminal justice system, and especially neglecting correctional services. 
Another advantage attributed to the Rule of Law Pool is that the people they 
deploy are not generalists with international experience but usually 
practitioners who have had long experience in their specific field of expertise 
in Norway and are considered to be at the top of their profession. They 
recruit staff with the direct assistance of the bodies responsible for those 
staff, such as the Department of Corrections for correctional staff, the court 
administration for judges, etc., and they help to identify the qualities they are 
looking for in their Pool staff. This ability of the Rule of Law Pool to recruit 
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senior Norwegian justice practitioners and bring them directly into contact 
with their counterparts was considered by some respondents to be one of the 
key reasons accounting for its impact and effectiveness. And as recruitment 
to the Pool is internal to the Ministry of Justice, international service has 
been made part of the career path at the Ministry of Justice, creating strong 
incentives for staff to participate.  
 
There are, however, external limitations to the model of deploying a Rule of 
Law Pool team bilaterally. Specifically, if the government of the receiving 
country does not actually want to implement systemic change in the justice 
sector, a Rule of Law Pool team deployment can be expected to have little 
impact. In such contexts, strong multilateral initiatives may carry more 
weight and leverage to deal with lack of political will for reform. Further, as 
the Rule of Law Pool is currently configured for a holistic approach, it is 
most appropriately deployed to a context in which there is a fairly strong and 
stable central authority that will be able to provide top–down support for its 
activities. The size of the prospective country of deployment also matters: a 
large country may overwhelm the Rule of Law team personnel resources and 
a single team would not be likely to have a significant influence at the 
strategic level, although they could provide assistance at local level – for 
example, in assisting in the reform of a specific prison. Another idea which 
has been mooted for deployments to large countries would have the Rule of 
Law Pool deploy in coordination with personnel from another like-minded 
donor, such as one of the Nordic countries. In view of declared interests in 
Nordic cooperation and donor harmonization, potential collaborative 
exercises such as this merit further consideration. However, the prospects for 
developing successful and sustainable joint initiatives may depend on partner 
countries also making international deployments part of the career path of 
justice sector personnel.  
 
There are also several domestic limitations pertaining to the Rule of Law 
Pool. Although it purports to cover the „chain of justice‟, one important 
element has remained missing from the Rule of Law Pool of Advisers: a 
police component. As laws are reformed, not only prosecutors and judges are 
affected; the police too must be trained in how to work within the new legal 
frameworks. Although individual police officers have been brought in on 
occasion by deployed Rule of Law Pool teams to give briefings on specific 
topics, police officers have not been deployed as regular team members in 
Rule of Law pool deployments. Norwegian police deployments take place 
within the framework of CIVPOL, the pool of police available for 
deployment maintained by the Police Directorate. The lack of systemic 
cooperation and coordination between police and the Rule of Law Pool 
weakens Norway‟s approach to strengthening the rule of law and security 
sector reform.   
 
Another domestic limitation appears to be linked to the cost of the Rule of 
Law Pool. Although initially developed for multilateral contexts, 
intergovernmental organizations generally do not welcome group 
deployments as they may concentrate the influence of a particular country, 
and opt instead for individual deployments. Team deployments from the 
Rule of Law Pool, which are preferred by those responsible for the Pool, 
consequently tend to take place in the context of bilateral assistance projects 
with smaller countries. While team deployments may have a significant 
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impact, they entail high costs for Norway, involving engagements of senior 
experts on high Norwegian salaries that may extend over several years. 
Team deployments from the Rule of Law Pool, in other words, can be an 
expensive means of providing assistance. Despite willingness to of the Rule 
of Law Pool to deploy in teams, the potential cost has posed an obstacle, and 
Norway has sometimes opted to send individuals from the Justice 
Department in lieu of a team. Ultimately the decision to deploy a Rule of 
Law team is also a political decision, and must be in harmony with 
Norwegian foreign policy priorities and funding constraints.    
 
While Styrkebrønnen appears to be well-suited to certain contexts 
(developed countries with a civil law system), concerns have been raised that 
it may be less well-suited to post-conflict contexts, and especially those 
having Islamic law (sharia) and/or traditional justice systems. The team was 
deployed to Georgia in 2004 (see below) and Moldova in 2007. The Georgia 
team recognized that having a police element was important for addressing 
the reform challenges in the complex system of criminal justice, and in this 
cases got around the absence of a police member of team by flying in a 
Norwegian police officer to lecture on certain topics. The Rule of Law Pool 
group deployments to Georgia and Moldova were assessed in positive terms. 
Factors of success included the size, composition and methods employed by 
the team.45 More recently, experts from the Rule of Law Pool were deployed 
to Afghanistan, with one group involved in the development of counter-
narcotics courts. The evaluation of the Afghanistan deployment was less 
positive than the Georgia and Moldova deployments, in part because the 
team eventually became detached from the priorities of Norwegian 
development assistance in the country (see below on Afghanistan).   
 
Also, although the senior-level staff who tend to comprise the Rule of Law 
Pool are seen as bringing distinct benefits to justice sector reform projects, 
some respondents suggested that the selection process is problematic; rather 
than recruiting on the basis of seniority in the legal and judicial profession, it 
was suggested that recruitment should be more tailored to local requirements 
in the area of deployment.  
 
In addition to the Rule of Law Pool, Norway has supported rule of law 
development and justice sector reform through the use of an implementing 
agent, the International Management Group (IMG) in the Western Balkans, 
specifically in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro (see below).  
3.4 Intelligence sector 
Intelligence reform is one of the most consistently neglected areas of 
security sector reform assistance. This may stem from perceived sensitivities 
of transitional states and the observation that the intelligence services of 
major powers often cultivate relations with the services in areas and 
countries of strategic interest, with a focus on cooperation and information-
sharing. It may also result from the feeling among some in donor capitals 
that intelligence is somehow not a proper focus for normal assistance 
programmes. Despite the key role of intelligence agencies in internal and 
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(NORLAG) and The Norwegian Mission of Rule of Law Advisers to Moldova (NORLAM), 
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external security, and the importance of developing governmental, 
legislative and even non-governmental capacities in the effective 
management and oversight of the intelligence sector, intelligence governance 
remains an underdeveloped and under-resourced area for security sector 
reform assistance. While major intelligence services often develop and 
maintain cooperative relations with counterparts in transitional contexts, it is 
far less common to find explicitly SSR-framed intelligence reform 
initiatives.  
 
It is notable then that Norway has provided sustained support to intelligence 
reform, in a context in which the stakes of reform have been particularly 
high. Norway has funded a multi-year programme in support of developing 
the federal-level Bosnia and Herzegovina Intelligence–Security Agency 
(OSA). Administered by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 
(NUPI), and in close cooperation with the OSCE and the Office of the High 
Representative (OHR), the programme has focused on restructuring, 
capacity-building and professionalization (see „Bosnia‟ below).  
 
Norway has additionally provided support to DCAF for a project developing 
security and intelligence oversight mechanisms and capacity for the Kosovo 
parliamentary assembly and members of relevant parliamentary committees. 
Also in terms of developing legislative oversight capacity, Norway has 
supported a DCAF regional programme to initially fund and train ten 
parliamentary staff advisers in security and defence affairs, including 
intelligence, in the seven Western Balkan countries.  
3.5 Development sector (NORAD) and SSR 
Norway‟s development agency, NORAD, is a directorate under the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. Although the concept of SSR emerged from the UK 
Department for International Development and other international 
development agencies have integrated to varying degrees integrated SSR 
into their work, the development community in Norway appears to have not 
systematically engaged with SSR. While conducting this study, we found 
few individuals working specifically on security sector reform at NORAD, 
and more questions than understanding of SSR in the development 
community more broadly. Development actors did not tend to perceive 
support to security sector reform, and particularly support to defence reform 
or police reform, as development assistance. The development agency does 
support capacity building in governance and efforts to combat gender-based 
violence, but appears to perceive SSR as more concerned with security, and 
not falling within the usual domain of development assistance.  
 
Several factors may explain this absence of the development community 
from SSR. One explanation maintains that SSR is a relatively new concept 
and framework; while the development community has in the past engaged 
in specific sectors, such as the re-establishment of order in a post-conflict 
setting, legal reform, courts and prisons, the SSR approach, which 
emphasizes the interconnected nature of the security and justice sectors and 
the need for an integrated, holistic approach, is a relatively recent 
development which the development community may not have had the time 
to understand.  
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Another possible reason for the failure of the development community to 
engage with SSR is exemplified by the Afghan case, in which the 
development community has become increasingly concerned about the 
character of development assistance and engagement in conflict areas and 
areas emerging out of conflict, in particular the blurring of lines between 
humanitarian and development activities on the one hand, and the military 
on the other. The deliberate blurring of lines between civilian and military 
undertakings in settings where Norway is engaged in counter-insurgency 
efforts has strengthened reluctance of development actors to engage with the 
SSR agenda.  
 
Finally, a third reason advanced by a respondent from the development 
community is linked to the perception that especially in certain high-profile 
cases, such as Afghanistan, SSR tends to be treated by the Norwegian 
government as a political issue; once a political decision is made that 
Norway should contribute in some way to security sector reform, it funds 
and implements projects without the usual planning and assessment that is 
more typical of development assistance programming. This more political 
approach to SSR engagement tends to leave out development methods and 
actors.  
3.6 Gender and SSR 
While Norway does not have a specific set of guidelines or strategy for 
promoting gender equality and sensitivity specifically within SSR, this 
remains a key cross-cutting issue, and its efforts in this domain can be seen 
within the wider context of its efforts to implement the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1325 (SCR 1325) of 2000. In 2006 Norway was one of the first 
states to develop a national action plan for implementation SCR 1325. In 
response to four further SCR resolutions on women, peace and security 
(SCR 1820, 1888, 1889 and 1960), Norway‟s national action plan was 
enhanced and updated in early 2011, with the publication of a new strategic 
plan on women, peace and security to cover the period 2011-2013, which 
aims mainly to strengthen the participation of women in peace and security 
efforts.46 The government also aims to reinforce its efforts to combat sexual 
violence in conflict, emphasising protection, prosecution and 
rehabilitation.47 This 2011 document in addition to Norway‟s 2006 Action 
Plan for SCR 1325 constitute the overall framework for integrating the 
gender perspective into Norwegian policy on peace and security.  
 
Lacking specific guidance for its approach to gender and SSR, the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in practice turns to DCAF as its main 
partner for conceptualizing, developing and implementing projects in this 
domain. Through DCAF‟s Gender and Special Projects Division, Norway 
supported the development of the Gender and Security Sector Reform 
(GSSR) Toolkit, the DCAF Gender Unit‟s flagship publication, which has 
also led to the development of a GSSR Training Resource Package.48 The 
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toolkit is used by some Norwegian officials responsible for women, peace 
and security in discussions with security sector actors.  
 
In West Africa Norway funds a DCAF project to collect basic information 
on the security sector in 15 state members of ECOWAS. This is the first 
effort to map security sectors in the region, and the project is expected to 
open up new areas for research and evidence-based issues for reform. 
Norway has also funded a global project which will work closely with 
several institutions active in training in SSR to mainstream gender into their 
curriculum and conduct a series of training-of-trainers (TOT) workshops.  
 
Norway also integrates a gender perspective into many of the bilateral 
assistance projects initiated, supported or implemented by the Police 
Directorate. One example is provided by its involvement in Liberia, 
including among other initiatives, the establishment of separate reception 
facilities in Liberia for women and children victims of abuse Women and 
Children‟s Protection Units (see below „Liberia‟). Another important 
example is its initiative to mentor a senior female police chief in 
Afghanistan, and provide self-defence training as well as coaching in 
leadership for female police officers (see below „Afghanistan‟).  
 
Through Norway‟s support of women‟s equality and gender issues, it has 
contributed to gender becoming an indisputable core, cross-cutting issue in 
the SSR policy discourse, and increasingly, in practice. Gender projects it 
funds have resulted in the development of conceptual „tools‟, basic training 
material and instruments, as well as the documentation of basic features of 
security sectors and security sector governance in the Western Balkans and 
West Africa. Beyond contributing to the development of a gender and SSR 
lens at a conceptual level and supporting projects that open up new areas for 
research, it is perhaps even more significant that a gender perspective has 
been integrated into Norwegian bilateral policing and justice reform 
programmes. It is in this commitment to supporting women‟s equality and 
gender sensitivity in the day-to-day practices of security and justice systems 
that Norway can take a leading role.  
3.7 Other actors 
An emerging trend in SSR is the outsourcing of bilateral assistance activities 
to third parties such as non-governmental organizations, consultancy firms 
or consortia, and private security companies. In this section we briefly 
examine three of the largest recipients of Norwegian government funding to 
support SSR-related activities.  
 
The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 
and the International Security Sector Advisory Team 
 
The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is 
an international foundation that specializes in security sector reform (SSR). 
Created in 2000, the Centre has over 100 staff from more than 30 countries. 
DCAF is based in Geneva, Switzerland, and has permanent offices in Beirut, 
Brussels, Ljubljana and Ramallah. The DCAF Foundation Council currently 
comprises 58 Member States. Norway has been a member of the Foundation 
Council since 2002.  
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DCAF provides assessments, program design, in-country advisory support, 
practical assistance programmes, capacity-building and training, monitoring 
and evaluation. It furthermore develops guidance tools, produces knowledge 
services and publications. DCAF‟s budget in 2010 reached 30.3 million 
Swiss francs, or about 198 million NOK. The Swiss government remains the 
largest contributor to DCAF‟s budget, but the share of funding provided by 
other governments is increasing. In 2010, other member states and 
international organizations contributed 7 million Swiss francs, or 26 percent 
of the total budget. Out of this, Norway alone contributed 2.3 million Swiss 
francs (approximately NOK 14 million), whereas the next biggest donor, 
Sweden, contributed 1.4 million Swiss francs (see DCAF Annual Report 
2010).  
 
The OECD recognizes contributions to DCAF as Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) under DAC guidelines. DCAF projects that receive 
Norwegian funding are predominantly implemented in the Western Balkans, 
but as mentioned above, several gender-focused SSR projects are also being 
carried out in Africa. Additionally, Norway has provided funding for an SSR 
project in Nepal, as well as for an African Union – United Nations seminar 
series on SSR. Norway has contributed substantially to projects such as 
Building an ethical police service - Toolkit on police ethics and anti-
corruption, and has done so also for the Gender and SSR toolkit. According 
to the MFA project registry, over the three years 2008, 2009 and 2010, 
Norway provided NOK 22.6 million to DCAF programming, coming to a 
total of NOK 28.6 million including core contributions to the ISSAT 
division, discussed below.  
 
We found no publicly available independent evaluations of DCAF, or of the 
programmes funded by Norway.  
 
International Security Sector Advisory Team 
 
The International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) was established 
in 2008 as a division of DCAF. It seeks to enhance the effectiveness and 
quality of individual member states‟ SSR efforts, as well as facilitate the 
coordination and coherence of their international assistance. ISSAT benefits 
from core funding from DCAF's central budget, DCAF's administrative 
support, and has access to DCAF's personnel, expertise and research 
capability.
49
 ISSAT's strengths are its operational expertise and experience, 
and good practice in gathering, and training capacity. 
 
ISSAT seeks to standardize training in SSR by developing training modules 
on SSR principles, practices, approaches and methodologies; SSR 
programme management; governance and democratic control of the security 
system; designing and undertaking SSR assessments; and monitoring, review 
and evaluation of SSR activities.
50
 ISSAT furthermore offers various courses 
to its donor members, such as training of trainers, SSR training for peace 
support operations, and pre-deployment briefings for senior personnel.  
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Over the last three years, Norway has provided NOK 6 million towards the 
establishment and core funding of ISSAT. ISSAT is valued by Norwegian 
interlocutors particularly as a forum in which donors can discuss common 
concerns and approaches to SSR.  
 
A recent UK-Dutch evaluation of ISSAT‟s activities since its establishment 
in 2008 found ISSAT performing field advisory support and training well in 
the face of rapidly growing demand for these services. The report 
nevertheless suggested that ISSAT develop means of measuring its impact, 
including measuring donor performance on SSR and testing assumptions of 
what constitutes „best practice‟ in SSR. The evaluation affirms the value that 
donors derive from ISSAT as an instrument to improve their own 
performance and that of other international actors in SSR. Since the UK-
Dutch evaluation focused on „whether ISSAT is doing the right things rather 
than whether it is doing them right‟, the latter qualitative element should be 
addressed in a follow-on review.  
 
 International Management Group 
 
When International Management Group (IMG) was established in 1994 at 
the initiative of UNHCR, it was intended to function as an ad-hoc technical 
group to address the specific technical and infrastructure problems faced in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. After a working-level meeting of the Humanitarian 
Issues Working Group (HIWG), IMG was granted a legal status and was 
empowered to function as an independent body. Subsequent meetings 
defined the IMG Statute, which still regulates its status and operation. Since 
then, IMG has grown considerably and is now operating in almost twenty 
countries worldwide. IMG is governed by a Steering Committee composed 
of donor governments as well as international and regional organizations that 
cooperate with IMG as contributors and implementing partners. 
 
Norway has used IMG as an executing agent for a range of projects in the 
law enforcement and justice sectors in the Western Balkans, including a 
project to improve the delivery of justice in the courts in Serbia, 
development of basic police training centre in Sremska Kamenica, Serbia, 
capacity building of the Customs administration of Serbia, creation of a 
document management system for the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
reform of public expenditure management within the Serbian Ministry of 
Interior, reform of the misdemeanour system in Montenegro, and 
development of an independent judiciary in Montenegro. Ten bilateral 
projects are currently being carried out by the IMG on Norway‟s behalf, 
whereas 42 projects have been completed.  
 
According to the Norwegian MFA‟s registers, IMG has received almost 
NOK 55.7 million NOK over the last three years. This makes Norway 
IMG‟s second biggest funding source currently, after the European 
Commission. For on-going projects, Norwegian funding makes up 26.2 
percent of IMG‟s total funding.  
 
According to information displayed on IMG‟s webpages, Norway has, in 
total, channeled almost € 40 million or approximately NOK 311.8 million 
bilaterally to IMG. This sum excludes additional funding for projects 
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conducted in collaboration with UNDP and OSCE, which amounts to € 
685.328 and € 2.5 million respectively.51 
 
No evaluations have recently been undertaken, despite IMG constituting one 
of Norway‟s main implementing agents for justice and security reform 
projects. IMG however received unanimously positive reviews from 
interviewees who had interacted with IMG regarding efficiency, 
management and project outcomes, as well as reporting and documenting 
their results. In this regard, an evaluation would be useful not only because 
of the level of funding involved, but also to gain a clearer understanding of 
the factors that contribute to IMG‟s success as an implementing agent in 
SSR.  
 
 Norwegian Refugee Council 
 
A perhaps less-known instrument of justice reform (specifically by 
improving access to justice) is the role played by the Norwegian Refugee 
Council (NRC) in legal counselling and capacity-building for the resolution 
of housing, land and property disputes for refugees, internally displaced 
persons and returnees in post-conflict situations.  
 
Land disputes are extremely common during and after conflict, with many 
disputes over land but few if any channels to address them. The weakness of 
land law and of the formal justice system as a means of resolving disputes 
often result in land disputes that linger for many years without resolution. 
Unresolved land disputes are often a cause of further intra- and inter-
communal conflict and violence. Women are moreover often victims in land 
disputes, a result of prejudicial legal frameworks and inadequate access to 
justice mechanisms, and frequently resulting in physical and sexual assault 
of women claimants. NRC‟s Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance 
(ICLA) programme works to raise awareness about the spectrum of 
mechanisms that exist, often in contexts where the formal justice system is 
largely non-functioning or non-accessible for the most vulnerable 
populations, and where customary justice systems often suffer from many 
problems, including discrimination against women. While counselling is a 
service provided to beneficiaries, i.e. to individuals involved in land 
disputes, ICLA also is involved in training lawyers, judges and community 
elders and other customary leaders in property law, as well as identifying 
legal gaps and other structural problems and flagging these to local or central 
governments. Additionally, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are 
emerging as additional means of accessing justice.  
 
This programme underscores that the justice sector not only encompasses the 
courts and other formal state institutions, but, particularly in many post-
conflict countries, often includes customary authorities as the primary justice 
system to which most people turn. Although not explicitly labelled an SSR 
programme, ICLA nevertheless encompasses the types of issues and 
objectives characteristic of security sector reform. It is holistic in the sense 
that it addresses both the formal justice system and customary justice 
mechanisms, targets structural reform and making government more 
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responsive to the needs of citizens, while empowering vulnerable groups in 
society. 
 
Over three years, from 2008-2010, NRC received around NOK 58.6 million 
for its legal aid support programmes for internally displaced persons in 
Georgia, Liberia, the Palestinian Administered Areas, Sri Lanka and Sudan.  
 
Independent evaluations of ICLA projects have been conducted and are 
publicly available on the NRC website.  
 
In summary, Norway is involved in various aspects of SSR through 
DCAF/ISSAT, IMG and NRC. ISSAT provides a forum for more strategic-
level guidance and dialogue within the donor community, whereas DCAF, 
IMG, and NRC offer project development and implementation in specific 
functional sectors and national or regional settings. Such actors provide 
technical expertise and can fill gaps in Norwegian programming, increasing 
the range and flexibility of Norwegian engagement with SSR. Nevertheless, 
more consideration should be given to the implications of outsourcing SSR 
projects and to identifying the key conditions and factors on which to base 
decisions to outsource. The outsourcing of SSR projects is generally likely to 
increase given the current economic environment for most donor 
governments. However, outsourcing SSR assistance also brings with it the 
risk of depoliticising a donor‟s engagement with SSR, as well as possibly 
increasing reliance on „prescriptive and technical approaches‟ that „constrain 
local initiative‟.52 Given the level of funding provided by Norway to select 
actors to implement SSR assistance, a more systematic approach towards 
selecting, overseeing and evaluating outsourced SSR projects and ensuring 
that they are in harmony with wider Norwegian objectives and reflect good 
practice is recommended. Conditions for outsourcing SSR assistance could 
be included as a component of a broader strategic policy framework for 
Norwegian engagement in SSR.   
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4. Country surveys 
One of the key regions in which Norway has provided support to the reform 
of the security sector is the Western Balkans. The nature of this assistance 
has shifted over time as conditions on the ground have shifted, typically 
progressing in each country from provision of humanitarian assistance to 
support for democratization and Euro-Atlantic integration. Norwegian 
involvement has generally evolved as the countries in the region have 
progressively and at different rates become more stabilised and democratic, 
and more engaged with NATO PfP and membership, the EU Stabilization 
and Association Process (SaP), and in some cases the accession process. 
Within the Western Balkans, Serbia has been the key focal point for 
Norway, owing to historical ties and a special defence relationship that has 
been particularly well-structured for reasons discussed below. In 2010 the 
three priority countries in the Western Balkan region receiving defence and 
security sector reform assistance from Norway were Serbia, Bosnia and 
Macedonia. Projects conducted in the first two of these countries will 
primarily be discussed in this section, in addition to a slightly earlier project, 
the support provided to Montenegro upon its independence for the creation 
of its Ministry of Defence.  
 
The Western Balkans is a region that faced a dual transition, emerging first 
from state socialism and most recently from ethnic and interstate conflict. 
From the donor perspective, the region has several advantages for SSR 
efforts. As developed European states, the populations of Western Balkan 
countries generally have high skills and education levels which facilitate the 
transfer of know-how. Some states, such as Serbia, already have strong 
central state apparatuses. New states, such as Bosnia, Montenegro, and 
Kosovo, face complex challenges of state building. However in most cases, 
these challenges are mitigated to some degree by strong political will for 
Euro-Atlantic integration. The objective of drawing closer to NATO and the 
EU, and for most countries the prospect of eventually becoming members, 
constitutes a strong incentive for domestic elites to introduce reforms. 
Challenges nevertheless remain, though, as Serbia remains opposed to 
NATO membership and ethnic divisions in Bosnia continue to undermine 
efforts to build a centralised state. Nevertheless, in the Western Balkans, 
Norway‟s SSR efforts have complemented and reinforced the movement of 
the countries towards membership of NATO and the EU.  
 
Norway has a rather unique arrangement with regard to the Western 
Balkans, in that it is the only region for which development assistance is run 
by the MFA rather than by NORAD. In the 1990s Norwegian engagement 
began as a humanitarian response, and subsequently became more politically 
oriented, especially from 1996-7. In 2010, the Norwegian MFA and MOD 
developed their first regional SSR strategy for the Western Balkans.   
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4.1 Bosnia 
Norwegian SSR efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina are broad ranging. In 2010 
the Norwegian MOD spent € 120,000 on efforts to build capacity for long 
term defense planning within the Bosnian MOD.53 Reform is also being 
carried out to increase the effectiveness of the federal-level BiH Intelligence-
Security Agency, which received NOK 9 million over the last three years. 
Norway is moreover lead nation of the NATO Trust Fund for resettlement 
and retraining of military personnel made redundant as a result of defence 
reform. In 2010, the NATO Trust Fund received close to NOK 4 million in 
contributions from Norway. 
 
Support to the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC) of Bosnia-
Herzegovina constitutes the main element of Norwegian support to judicial 
reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and has received approximately NOK 27 
million over the past three years. Several projects also focus on the Registry 
for War Crimes to assist the national authorities in developing an effective, 
independent and efficient judiciary at the state level. 
 
Two important Norwegian SSR projects in Bosnia are focused on 
strengthening federal-level integrated institutions. One DSSR project 
involved the transfer of knowledge and building of competence in the 
Bosnian MOD. The Bosnian Army and Ministry of Defence were created as 
a result of the 2005 Law on Defence. The Army is one of the few integrated 
institutions in the country – although the army is composed of three brigades 
that retain some distinct ethnic features, the command structure has been 
integrated. Prior to the integration in 2005, there were two MODs (one each 
in Republika Srpska and the Bosniak-Croat Federation. Norwegian 
assistance has focused in DSSR on building competence in the integrated 
MOD structure. Norway provided technical advice on how to conduct long-
term defence planning, by providing experts in Norwegian defence planning 
-- economists, operational analysts and scenario experts (political scientists). 
The objective was to help BiH develop an affordable defence plan for its 
structure for the next 20 years. Producing the plan was important, but the 
real long-term objective was to increase the capacity in the Bosnian MOD to 
conduct defence planning. 
 
The second SSR project Norway has supported in Bosnia is to support the 
establishment and capacity-building of the federal-level Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Intelligence-Security Agency (OSA). Intelligence reform is 
part of SSR according to OECD DAC but often remains outside the scope of 
activity of regular international actors. Reform activities are often handled 
by western intelligence agencies with little or no scrutiny or coordination 
with other parts of the security systems. In Bosnia, the High Representative 
sought to regularize this sphere of reform as part of the overall efforts of 
centralization and reform of the security sector. But there was no apparent 
international institutional actor to take a lead role or provide the necessary 
funding. In this instance, Norway‟s flexibility as an SSR actor ensured that 
an important gap was filled with a program that had a pilot project in 2005 
and started out as a multiyear program in cooperation with the OSCE from 
2006. The intelligence reform program emerged in a coincidental manner as 
a result of a Norwegian national who had been funded by the MFA and 
seconded through NORDEM to the OHR, where he held the intelligence 
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portfolio. This individual involved NUPI as the implementing agent that 
provided both professional knowledge and administered the funds on behalf 
of the MFA. Intelligence is a sensitive and politicized part of SSR but 
Norway had a distinct advantage in being a small power and one with no 
obvious national agenda or interests to further in the region. This enabled it 
to gain the trust within Bosnia and among the major states involved in its 
reconstruction. The project was greatly facilitated by having a key „dual-
hatted‟ implementer who was very familiar with local conditions, relevant 
local and international actors, and with good connections to the relevant 
ministries in Oslo.  
 
Benchmarking in this case was challenging because of the many intangible 
elements involved in creating such an agency in an extremely sensitive 
political situation. While quantitative figures for the project exist, such as 
numbers trained, courses held, etc, the more intangible elements of team-
building and trust-building among the multi-ethnic personnel within the 
institution were much more difficult to measure. Initially a three-year 
project, and extended for several  more years, the project supported the 
development of capacity and competencies through training-of-trainers, 
advanced academic training, use of open sources, library services, 
introduction to NATO intelligence concepts, and in-service courses to 
improve the level of knowledge and effectiveness of staff and of the 
institution more broadly. Support was also provided to the parliamentary 
oversight committee. After the initial period establishing the programme, 
effort was made to minimize the use of foreign consultants and instead 
emphasized „buying locally‟ in terms of using Bosnia-based enterprises to 
provide management training and language courses. Relevant Norwegian 
institutions like the Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM), the 
Norwegian Parliamentary Oversight Committee, the MoD and the MoJ have 
provided assistance to the intelligence reform project in Bosnia.     
 
In addition to the strengthening of security sector institutions in Bosnia, 
Norway is supporting the resettlement and retraining of redundant military 
personnel. Norway is co-lead, along with the Netherlands and Slovenia, of 
the NATO Trust Fund. With the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) acting as the executing agent, the Bosnia reintegration project aims to 
provide new skills and opportunities for redundant soldiers.54 Following the 
successful five-year programme that was carried out in Serbia to help with 
reintegration, the Bosnian project is expected to follow the same path and 
run for three years. As noted in this report‟s section on Serbia, Norway‟s 
approach to reintegration has emphasized training-the-trainers, building up 
local capacity and ensuring local ownership.  
 
Bosnia, where unemployment is now unofficially over 40 percent, needs to 
replace some 3000 professional soldiers. Most have spent six years in the 
army, are between 35-38 years old, and are too old to be infantry soldiers 
and too young yet to be pensioned. Taking their weapon and discharging 
them isn‟t sufficient; it is recognised that there is a need to support them, or 
face a very real risk that these men, who are very likely to be unemployed 
given the current state of the economy, will drift into crime or organized 
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crime. The NATO Trust Fund supports this process. The project involves the 
establishment by the Bosnian MOD of a transition organization, a central 
office based in Sarajevo, which maintains close contact with the DDR expert 
at NDUC, and four different resettlement centres around the country. There 
are 2-3 civilian and military advisers at each centre. The centres provide 
counselling, education, training and networks with labour departments, 
universities, agriculture, etc. and new opportunities for former soldiers, 
encouraging small business generation. The reintegration programme also 
provides a fund that provides a modest amount of start-up funding for small 
businesses of the redundant soldiers, upon approval of a business plan. The 
contribution towards retraining and reintegration by the NTF counts as 
ODA, and as such this contribution to DSSR is funded by the Norwegian 
MFA.  
4.2 Montenegro 
Norwegian SSR efforts in Montenegro are mainly focused on enhancing 
democratic civilian oversight over the armed forces by building capacity in 
the Ministry of Defence. According to their own figures, the Norwegian 
MFA allocated NOK 4.8 million for this project via the MOD between 2008-
2010. There is also a substantial bilateral effort ongoing in the justice sector. 
Most notably, IMG has received NOK 9.4 million over the last two years to 
help reform the misdemeanor system in Montenegro and implement an 
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Strategy for the 
Judiciary.  
 
Norway‟s primary form of support to Montenegro‟s SSR involved 
Norwegian MOD assistance to building up the Montenegrin defence 
ministry. It is an interesting example because it was considered a test case of 
the methodology of MOD assistance to civilian institutions. Although 
Montenegro at the time was not a priority country for Norwegian engage-
ment in the region, the opportunity to become involved came along when 
Montenegro declared its independence in 2006, dissolving the union of 
Serbia and Montenegro. When Montenegro asked all NATO countries for 
statebuilding assistance, Norway was able to become involved at a relatively 
modest cost.  
 
Moreover, Montenegro is considered by Norwegian defence officials as an 
interesting test case for an SSR project. In part this is because, as a 
developed European country, it constituted a receptive environment for 
Norwegian assistance. Further, harmonization with NATO and EU standards 
was a high priority for the government of the newly independent state, which 
translated into political will to implement the needed reforms. 
 
Norway‟s SSR assistance to building the Montenegrin defence ministry was 
in the area of democratic civilian control of the military, and as such was 
entirely ODA-eligible. Norwegian assistance directly involved training some 
50-60 people, mostly civilians and some military. The participation of MOD 
personnel was considered desirable because traditional development actors 
do not „do‟ civilian control of the security sector, which requires knowledge 
and experience of working within a civilian ministry of defence. Through a 
process of bilateral dialogue, the priorities and needs were mapped, with four 
specific entry points identified: human resources, security policy 
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formulation, defence budgeting, and planning (i.e. acquisition of complex 
defence systems). The participation of MOD personnel in mentoring and 
training of defence ministry staff in Montenegro required good will on the 
part of the various departments of Norway‟s MOD. This is because Norway 
has a relatively small MOD that counts about 300 employees. Consequently, 
the absence of the 5-10 individuals used as mentors on the Montenegro 
programme was felt when they spent a week every 3 months in Montenegro.  
 
In 2008 Norway initiated a bilateral cooperation with Montenegro involving 
the coastguard. Norwegian assistance has been requested for undertaking 
risk assessments, but so far the Montenegrin authorities has not decided on 
how to organize their coastal surveillance and coastguard. Norway has 
however, marketed its competence within coastguard issues as a basis for a 
potential regional cooperation, and regional conferences has been conducted 
with participation from Montenegro, Albania, BiH, Slovenia and Croatia. 
The Norwegian Coast Guard is the main donor both technical and financial, 
but Italy and Greece increasingly hold observatory statuses.  
4.3 Serbia 
Serbia remains the key focal point of Norwegian SSR engagement within the 
Western Balkans. The defense sector has been subjected to the most 
structured efforts of cooperation. Firstly, Norway is lead nation for the 
NATO Trust Fund for resettlement and retraining of redundant military 
personnel, which received €420,000 from Norway last year.55 Secondly, 
Norway contributes substantially to both military educational reform 
(€400,000 in 2010) as well as capacity building within the Serbian MOD on 
defence planning and strategy (€325,000 in 2010).56 The increasing 
internationalization of the Serbian defence sector is reflected in the military-
medical cooperation and contribution to the Norwegian field hospital in the 
UN peace operation in Chad. 
 
Norway has been involved bilaterally in justice sector reform since 2007 
through the project Improving the delivery of justice in the courts in Serbia. 
The project is being implemented by IMG. In 2010 Norway decided to 
allocate NOK 33 million in further contributions to the justice reform 
project.57 Norway has moreover conducted a long-running bilateral police 
project, JuNo, with the Police Directorate as the main implementing actor.  
 
Norway‟s active engagement in Serbia reflects the special relationship and 
historically close ties between the two countries that dates back to World 
War II.58 These ties contributed to the perception of Norway as an honest 
broker in Serb relations with NATO and OSCE, and its role in facilitating 
Serbian membership in NATO‟s Partnership for Peace, requested in 2003 
and which occurred in 2006. Over the period 2000-2008, Norway provided 
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NOK 1.5 billion to Serbia, although the actual amount is likely higher as the 
figure does not take into account projects classified as regional but which 
took place mostly in Serbia.59 Its programming has shifted to reflect changes 
on the ground. A recent evaluation of Norwegian assistance to the Western 
Balkans identified three phases in Norwegian support to Serbia: from 1993-
2000 it took the form of humanitarian assistance to assist the influx of 
refugees into Serbia, and support of the democratic opposition, which was 
subject to harassment. With the fall of the Milosevic regime and the 
establishment of a new government in 2000 until 2003, Norwegian 
assistance shifted towards stabilising the new democratic regime and 
consolidating its democratic institutions. From 2003, Norwegian assistance 
has focused on supporting Serbia‟s democratization and integration into 
Euro-Atlantic structures.  
 
Support to security sector reform has been a key feature of Norwegian 
assistance to Serbia since the fall of the Milosevic regime and its 
replacement with a democratic regime. Norwegian SSR support to Serbia 
has been strong, relatively systematic and sustained, with substantial 
involvement in each of the defence, police and justice sectors. However 
cooperation in the defence sector has been especially strong and structured. 
In particular, this is because an operational dimension was added through the 
co-deployment of a Serbian military contingent with Norway in Chad. This 
co-deployment was viewed by some as a driving force for much of the 
defence cooperation, the factor that kept a high level of political and 
professional attention on bilateral defence cooperation. Judicial and police 
reform have also been a focus in Serbia, but not as structured as defence 
cooperation. The three sectors will be discussed below.  
 
As both a post-communist and post-conflict country, post-Milosevic Serbia 
possessed a bloated military apparatus that was obsolete, ill-suited to 
respond to the new security environment, and costly to maintain. Thus in the 
area of defence sector reform, Serbia faced the challenge of downsizing, 
restructuring and modernising its armed forces, and implementing effective 
democratic civilian control over its armed forces. The Serb armed forces 
have undergone significant reform over the past several years, and Norway 
has contributed in various ways.  
 
In a 2006 strategy document the Norwegian MFA identified support for the 
reform of Serbia‟s security sector as being within the broader strategy of 
supporting Serbia as a democratic state based on the rule of law. The 
overarching goals of Norwegian support were to contribute a model of 
democratic civil-military relations, strengthen NATO‟s cooperation with 
Serbia and Montenegro (complimentary with NATO‟s conditional 
requirements for PfP membership), and through bilateral reform assistance 
contribute to promoting Norway as a credible and relevant actor within the 
field of SSR. To those ends, Norway identified three main priorities for SSR 
support to Serbia and Montenegro: training and reintegration of redundant 
military personnel; internationalization and enhancing institutional 
competence and capacity in relation to Peace Support Operations; and 
strengthening civilian oversight of the defence sector.60     
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Within the Serbian defence sector, Norway‟s top priority project in 2010 was 
to help strengthen the capacity of the Ministry of Defence to engage in long-
term defence planning, budgeting and personnel management. As the 
Serbian Ministry of Defence was the inheritor of most of the MOD capacity 
from former Yugoslavia, it already had a relatively high level of com-
petence. Norwegian assistance focused on helping Serbia to further develop 
its competencies and provide the tools and training that would enable the 
Serbian MOD to identify an affordable force structure and to plan for long-
term defence restructuring. This involved defence economic analysis and the 
use of planning scenarios, identification of force goals and the calculation of 
capability requirements. Typically the Norwegian Defence Research 
Establishment (Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt, or FFI), with funding from the 
MOD, sends a group of 3 or 4 people to Belgrade to conduct workshops, 
which are held 2-3 times per year. The trainers stay in contact with the 
members of groups who receive training throughout the year.  
 
It was noted that one of the problems encountered was with the frequent 
reassignments and changes in Serbian personnel receiving training, creating 
discontinuity and delays in creating a cadre of Serbian trainers who could 
then train their colleagues. Another problem from the Norwegian side was 
the absence of the „bigger picture‟, that is not seeing how the Norwegian 
trainers‟ efforts were contributing to democratization and transformation in 
the recipient countries, as a factor limiting enthusiasm and commitment over 
the longer term.  
 
A high priority project has been in the area of military-medical cooperation, 
involving the donation of a military field hospital to Serbia and education 
and training. This has enabled Serbia to contribute with medical elements to 
international military and peace operations, important for building trust and 
improving Serbia‟s international image. Indeed, the Serb armed forces 
medical team was deployed in 2009-10 as part of the Norwegian contingent 
(field hospital) in MINURCAT, the UN peace operation in Chad. 
Additionally, through a parallel project with Macedonia, Norway has 
contributed to strengthening capacities of both for common deployment (as 
was seen in the co-deployment of Serbian military medics with Norwegian 
peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan) and for regional medical cooperation in 
the Western Balkans. It is important not to underestimate the impact of this 
project resulting in co-deployment of Norwegian and Serb elements. The 
operational element of this assistance project provided added value and 
transformed what could have been a mere technical assistance project into 
one that was more properly seen as cooperation sustaining high levels of 
political and professional interest and commitment.  
 
Another priority DSSR project involved the establishment from late 2005 
(July 2006) and continuing support to a NATO/Partnership for Peace Trust 
Fund. Through NATO/Partnership for Peace Trust Funds, individual alliance 
members and partners promote security and defence reform in partner 
countries by supporting demilitarization projects and defence reform 
projects. The NTF for Serbia was established to help reintegrate redundant 
personnel in the Serbian defence sector as it downsized and restructured its 
armed forces. Norway initiated the project, providing 30 percent of the Trust 
Fund‟s budget, and as it was joined by numerous other donor countries in 
contributing to the NATO/PfP TF for Serbia, Norway served as lead 
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nation.61 It is worth noting that the NTF for Serbia was not a typical 
demobilization project, but became an innovative programme for developing 
small and medium-sized enterprises in Serbia. The fund supported the 
Serbian Ministry of Defence in managing the downsizing of armed forces 
personnel through the provision of vocational training, job placement and 
start-up capital for redundant military personnel in Serbia, thus contributing 
to their reintegration into civilian life and livelihoods. The executing agency 
was the International Organization for Migration (IOM). In addition Norway 
supported the establishment of a retraining centre for non-commissioned 
officers. Bilaterally funded, Denmark also contributes and serves as lead 
nation. The rehabilitation of demobilised soldiers counts as official 
development assistance, and hence these DSSR projects are funded in 
Norway by the MFA through the MOD.   
 
Norway also provides support to the Belgrade School for Security Studies 
(formerly the Centre for Civil-Military Relations), which was recently 
acknowledged in an international survey as a leading think tank in the 
region. The BSSS constitutes a source of independent civilian expertise on 
security and defence affairs, produces high quality policy research and 
analysis, and has made a major contribution to enriching public discourse on 
security and defence affairs.  
 
In terms of supporting police reform in Serbia, Norway has had a long-
running bilateral police cooperation programme to assist police reforms and 
more broadly democratization. Initiated in 2001, the Yugoslavia-Norway 
(JuNo) programme is funded by the MFA and involves the Police 
Directorate (POD) as main implementing agent, using Norwegian police 
trainers and police professionals to build capacity of personnel through 
training and provision of equipment. JuNo projects have been developed in 
coordination with the OSCE, which is responsible for coordinating 
international police assistance for Serbian police reform. JuNo projects have 
also enjoyed support from the Serbian Interior Ministry, and a good 
reputation among the Serbian police. After the disintegration of Yugoslavia, 
the name was retained at request of Serbia because the programme had 
already gained familiarity among police.  
 
JuNo has encompassed five successive projects which have focused on 
different substantive areas of reform, from forensic crime investigation labs 
to „problem-oriented‟ community policing. The first JuNo project from 
2001-2 was a model police project and provided training to all members of 
the police service in Vojvodina, Backa Palanka. Subjects included 
leadership, community policing, economic investigation, narcotics 
investigation, and crime scene investigation. Equipment was also provided 
(radio equipment, information technology, crime scene investigation 
equipment, traffic service equipment and upgrading of police station 
equipment).  
 
JuNo 2 in 2004 established a regional crime laboratory in Novi Sad, which 
was responsible for the Vojvodina region, and upgraded forensic equipment. 
Crime lab personnel were extensively trained in the use of the equipment, as 
well as in the subjects covered in JuNo 1. At the initiative of the OSCE, the 
successful Novi Sad model was replicated for the creation of other regional 
                                                     
61  Evaluation Western Balkans, Vol II (2010), p. 88.  
A Stocktaking of Norwegian Engagement in Security Sector Reform 59 
crime labs in Nis and Podgorica, Montenegro. Norway funded the OSCE 
project in Nis, and partially funded that in Podgorica, while training 
personnel in both locations.  
 
JuNo 3 emerged in late 2004 at the initiative of the Serbian police, who 
developed a strategic plan for the introduction of community policing 
through the use of strategic management, operational crime analysis and 
problem-oriented policing (POP). The pilot project focused on the seven 
police districts covering the Vojvodina region in 2005, training police 
leaders and trainers, in a train-the-trainers approach.  
 
JuNo 4 and 5 covering the period 2007-2009 were focused on facilitating the 
Serbian plan for national implementation of community policing through 
problem-oriented policing and operational crime analysis. Although this was 
understood as requiring several years to implement, and Norway‟s 
engagement through the process was also assumed, Norway was only able to 
agree to one year of project cooperation at a time. JuNo 4 focused on 
training at the senior and middle management levels, drawing on the Serbian 
trainers who had been trained in JuNo 3. JuNo 5 continued the work of the 
preceding project, introduced classrooms in the police districts for further 
training at the local level, and also involved local projects in POP in every 
police district.  
 
The JuNo programme appears to have enjoyed strong local ownership, with 
consistent support both at the top levels of political leadership and among 
professional cadres in the Ministry of Interior. The Norwegian project 
management prioritized a thorough assessment and planning phase before 
the project started. The JuNo projects were also structured so that Serbia 
would take increasing responsibility for planning and implementation. JuNo 
4 and 5 saw a gradual handing over of responsibility for project content and 
implementation from the Norwegians to the Serbian side, taking over 50 
percent of the teaching. Further, the projects were planned with cooperation 
from OSCE in terms of identifying topics for courses and teaching methods. 
The JuNo projects are believed to have contributed to the improvement of 
relations and rebuilding of trust between police and local communities.  
 
Norway has also supported police reform through the secondment of senior 
Norwegian police officers to key positions in the Law Enforcement Division 
of the OSCE Mission in Serbia. Norway has also supported the 
modernization of information management systems at the Ministry of 
Interior, a project implemented by International Management Group (IMG).  
 
Norway has been relatively less engaged in legal and justice sector reform in 
Serbia than in defence or policing. One explanation for this was that as EU 
membership is a top Serbian priority, and the EU has a developed framework 
within its accession process for judicial reform, that this was better left to 
EU actors. Nevertheless, in 2010 Norway funded IMG to implement two 
justice sector reform programmes in Serbia.  
 
Serbia is an example of strong engagement by Norway as a donor towards 
SSR. It is the case where there was a high level of political and professional 
commitment and sustained involvement, as evidenced by the extensive 
multi-component DSSR projects and the successive projects to support 
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police reform. Much of this is due to the special relationship between Serbia 
and Norway, and the role played by Norway in encouraging a 
rapprochement between Serbia and NATO and facilitating Serbia‟s 
membership of the Partnership for Peace.  
 
Finally, Norway has also provided support to Serbian civil society 
organizations that contribute to research and analysis of the security sector in 
Serbia as well as its regional setting, enriching policy discourse and 
strengthening informal oversight. The Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 
subsequently renamed the Belgrade School of Security Studies, is a key civil 
society recipient of Norwegian funding, conducting high quality analysis on 
various issues relating to Euro-Atlantic integration, regional cooperation and 
SSR. For the period 2009-2012, the CCMR/BSSS has received NOK 4.4 
million in support of developing knowledge-based governance of the 
security sector in Serbia and the Western Balkans.  
4.4 Georgia 
Norwegian assistance to Georgia has mainly been focused around capacity 
building in the legal sector through the deployment of the Norwegian Rule 
of Law Pool. Approximately NOK 20 million has been allocated for this 
purpose over the period 2008-2010. The Norwegian Mission of Legal 
Advisors (NORLAG) has contributed in the development of a strategic plan 
for Georgia‟s criminal justice system, with an emphasis on making the penal 
system more humane. The Norwegian Refugee Council‟s Information, 
Counseling and Legal Assistance (ICLA) project contributes to the efforts in 
the justice sector, and has received around NOK 5.25 million within the 
same timeframe.  
 
The military component of Norwegian support is channeled through the 
NATO Professional Development Program, where Norway is lead nation on 
human resource management. 
 
In October 2004 the Judicial Crisis Response Pool deployed for the first 
time, sending a team of advisers to Georgia. In NORLAG, the approach of 
the Crisis Response Pool experts has been to approach the host country‟s 
criminal justice system institutions – government, courts, prosecution 
service, prison system and probation service – at strategic level where 
policies and strategic decision making takes place, where they offer advice 
on strategic issues and how to implement reforms in practice. This top-down 
approach is complemented at the technical level where they offer awareness-
raising and training to practitioners.62  
 
The primary focus of the Norwegian Mission of Legal Advisers to Georgia 
(NORLAG) was to improve knowledge of new laws within the Georgian 
criminal justice system, encourage the development of appropriate mindsets, 
and help their Georgian counterparts to develop appropriate practices. To 
that end, NORLAG contributed in the formulation of the strategic plan for 
Georgia‟s criminal justice system in 2005. Other noted impacts include its 
contributions to making the Georgian penal system more humane, for 
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example by ensuring that convicts have a right to perform meaningful 
activities while in jail, and widening the use and application of community-
service sentencing. NORLAG has also sought to improve the fairness and 
efficiency of trials.63  
4.5 Democratic Republic of Congo 
Norway‟s programmatic funding in development aid to the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) is predominantly humanitarian. Secondments, the 
other form of Norwegian assistance, have fulfilled various roles in human 
rights monitoring, rule of law and SSR. The main focus areas are fight 
against sexual and gender based violence (SGBV), support of victims of 
SGBV and demobilization and reintegration of former soldiers, including 
children.  
 
Norway seconds several civilian observers to MONUSCO‟s Joint 
Monitoring Teams (JMTs) and the Stabilization Support Unit, as well as a 
military secondment to a strategic-level position on SSR. Norway is 
moreover engaged in justice sector reform and the fight against impunity, 
focusing especially on building capacity to process cases of SGBV. Hence, 
in 2010 Norway supported the UNDP STAREC stabilization program to 
help victims of sexual violence with NOK 11.7 million.  
 
Norway‟s engagement with SSR in DRC is composed of several elements. 
First it consists of a military secondment to a strategic-level position at 
MONUC on SSR. Following the visit of the Norwegian defence minister to 
DRC in January 2009, Norway responded to a United Nations request for 
personnel to support SSR efforts on the ground by funding from the summer 
of 2009 a Norwegian military officer in the position of Deputy Coordinator 
of the SSR Unit at MONUC (subsequently renamed United Nations 
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, or 
MONUSCO in July 2010). The position has so far been filled by two Air 
Force colonels, each deployed for a one year period, with a third deploying 
in the summer of 2011. The MONUSCO SSR unit (renamed the Security 
Sector Development or SSD Unit in September 2010) occupies a strategic 
position in the mission, which enables it to acquire a central overview of the 
various defence, police and justice sector reform initiatives, including 
measures against sexual and gender-based violence. DPKO‟s SSD Unit 
reports positively of this contribution, and the MFA has in turn benefited, 
gaining from experience and information about the mission, relations with 
Congolese authorities, and the situation in DRC in general. Despite its 
central position, the MONUSCO SSD Unit‟s coordinating potential has been 
hampered by several major challenges, not least the lack of political will 
among the national authorities and the absence of an inter-ministerial 
steering committee, resulting in very limited progress in SSD and a 
predominance of uncoordinated bilateral approaches and assistance 
programmes.  
 
Second, Norway currently seconds several civilian observers, a specialist in 
sexual violence, a field coordinator, and an expert in witness protection to 
the MONUSCO peacekeeping mission in DRC. Norway is currently 
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providing funding for three civilian observers deployed through NORDEM 
(the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights) to 
MONUSCO‟s Joint Monitoring Teams (JMT), two in the field and one as 
liaison officer in Goma. The JMT are small teams consisting of two UN 
police and two and civilian human rights officers from MONUSCO. The 
JMT were originally created as an initiative of the Swedish Foreign Ministry 
to contribute to stabilization in the eastern Congo, in particular the 
restoration of state control and authority in conflict-affected areas previously 
held by armed factions. The JMTs were established to observe, guide and 
monitor the newly formed national police units of the Police Nationale 
Congolaise (PNC), and also the judiciary and administrative authority to 
ensure their conduct is in line with international and national human rights 
norms and standards, and to serve as a liaison between national authorities 
and MONUC. Deployment of JMTs are considered important steps towards 
improving relations between police, local communities and armed groups, as 
well as strengthening efforts to combat human rights violations and SGBV. 
Although the implementation of the JMT mandate faced considerable 
challenges and obstacles in its first year, where the JMTs did succeed in 
being operational, they are credited with having an effect on the behaviour of 
the national police.64 The civilian observers have contributed significantly to 
the JMTs, and there is mutual benefit to having police and civilian personnel 
working together. The JMT moreover is the only existing civilian monitoring 
mechanism linking the international community to state presence in the 
field.65 Between February 2009 and June 2011, Norway has funded 3-4 
civilian experts at a time, 10 in total, most with a strong human rights or 
observer background, who were recruited and deployed through the 
NORDEM, in some cases in cooperation with AFDEM, NRC and 
MONUSCO to the JMT in MONUC.66 The JMT, unlike the Joint Protection 
Teams (JPT), are deployed permanently. The 12 positions of civilian 
observers in the JMTs have so far been funded by Sweden and Norway 
through secondment agreements, but the UN is currently considering how to 
integrate the positions in their own structure.  
 
Via NORDEM, Norway also seconds a field coordinator to MONUSCO‟s 
Stabilization Support Unit in Goma, eastern Congo, which aims to 
strengthen governmental structures, in particular the police and judicial 
system, in areas where the state has been weak or non-existent. Another 
secondment to the same function in Bukavu is secured and the deployment is 
expected within a couple of months. NORDEM also seconds a Sexual 
Violence Coordination Officer, who assists national authorities in 
coordinating activities under the national strategy for combating sexual 
violence. This includes activities within the field of SSR. And from 30 May 
2011, NORDEM has also seconded an expert in witness protection to the 
MONUSCO and OHCHR Joint Human Rights Office in Kinshasa, who will 
provide protection to witnesses in cases of crimes against humanity in 
coordination with national authorities and NGOs.  
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44, n65.  
A Stocktaking of Norwegian Engagement in Security Sector Reform 63 
Third, Norway is also engaged in justice sector reform and the fight against 
impunity, focusing on building the skills and capacities required to process 
cases of sexual violence. It does this by supporting the government of DRC‟s 
stabilization plan, the Programme de Stabilisation et de Reconstruction des 
Zones sortant des conflits armés (STAREC). Norwegian support to 
STAREC is channelled through UNDP, and is earmarked „sexual violence, 
which constitutes one of the main pillars of the programme. In 2010, 
Norwegian support to STAREC amounted to some 11.7 million NOK. 
Norway also provides funding for the American Bar Association‟s 
programmes to promote access to justice, and funds a Norwegian researcher 
at PRIO and consultant to the International Criminal Court, Morten 
Bergsmo, who has been invited by the DRC‟s Minister of Justice to identify 
areas for reform in the justice sector, particularly in terms of specialised 
training of judges.  
 
Norway is thus engaged in a variety of statebuilding projects in DRC and 
supports protection of civilians and especially the fight against SGBV. 
Norway‟s support to SSR in DRC concentrates on the seconding of several 
military and civilian experts to positions that support stabilization and SSR 
efforts. The secondment of consecutive Norwegian military officers to the 
position of Deputy Coordinator in the MONUSCO SSD Unit provides an 
excellent vantage point for understanding the national needs for army, police 
and justice reform, the interplay of contributions from international actors, 
and the gaps in SSR donor assistance. Nevertheless, Norway‟s SSR 
engagement remains somewhat piecemeal although Norway‟s assistance to 
DRC is provided in line with the overall Congolese and international 
strategy for stabilization and statebuilding. At the current time there is little 
indication that Norway will strengthen its engagement in DRC in any or all 
of the core pillars of armed forces, police or justice sectors.   
4.6 Liberia 
Liberia is currently the largest single receiver of Norwegian bilateral 
assistance in West Africa, with efforts being focused on energy cooperation, 
rebuilding infrastructure, and reforming the security sector. As of June 2011, 
eleven Norwegian police officers are seconded to UNMIL. They work in 
various police units with their Liberian counterparts in Liberia National 
Police (LNP), and some teach at the Monrovia Police Academy. Norway has 
financed the construction of protection centers for women and children, 
attached to ten regional police stations, as well as one at the Women and 
Children Protection Unit (WACPU) Headquarters in Monrovia. In addition 
Norway has funded rehabilitation and expansion of the Police Academy 
buildings in Monrovia. 
 
Following a devastating 14-year civil war which ended in 2003, Liberia 
remains a fragile country that struggles to deal with the legacies of the 
displacement of over one million people, destruction of the infrastructure, 
and high rates of SGBV and other violent crimes. In post-conflict societies, 
there is typically a marked increase in gender-based violence, and Liberia is 
no exception. The high level of violence against girls and women is 
exacerbated by lack of capacity of the formal judicial system to administer 
justice, and low levels of access to the formal justice system especially in 
rural areas. Customary law compensation often goes to the family of the 
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victim rather than to the victim herself, and stigmatization, ostracism and 
rejection of victims of SGBV by their families and communities are 
common.   
 
Norway‟s support to SSR programmes in Liberia demonstrates flexibility 
and sensitivity to local context and needs. However, despite good intentions, 
some projects, in the early stages after the war, were introduced with little 
planning or assessment and produced some unintended consequences. 
Nevertheless, adjustments were made, indicating the ability to learn from 
experience. 
 
Liberia was by 2009 the largest single recipient of Norwegian bilateral 
assistance in West Africa.
67
 Total funding in 2009 was NOK 106.8 million 
and by 2010 had reached NOK 179 million. One of the main areas of 
commitment is stabilization of peace and the improvement of public safety. 
To that end Norway has contributed in several reinforcing ways to 
strengthening the Liberian National Police, particularly in its efforts to deal 
with the widespread problem of SGBV. Between 2008-2010, UNDP police 
projects received NOK 10.2 million. 
 
Upon meeting with Norway‟s Minister of International Development, the 
newly inaugurated President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in 2006 requested 
Norwegian assistance in peacebuilding. One of the areas of need was 
indicated by the high rates of SGBV; Liberia has high rates of intimate 
partner violence and many cases of abused women and children, and 
Liberian authorities have acknowledged their inability to respond to this 
adequately. Norway has responded with capacity building, training and 
infrastructure. First, with UNDP as executing agent, Norway has supported 
the creation of eleven Women and Children‟s Protection Units (WACPUs), 
ten county Police Headquarters with WACPUs, and one WACPU attached to 
the LNP Headquarters in Monrovia. The WACPU are reception centres for 
abused women and children. Due to the lack of police station facilities, 
victims were previously often interviewed while the alleged perpetrator was 
in the same room. In addition to training the LNP on how to manage 
reported cases of rape and SGBV, Norway‟s provision of infrastructure in 
the form of the WACPUs has helped to improve how women and children 
victims of abuse and violence are treated by the police.  
 
One of the lessons learned with this project, however, was that if one going 
to create a new unit within the police, one must take into consideration how 
it can be established without interfering with the existing police authority 
structure.  Creating wholly new and well-equipped WACPUs must be done 
in harmony with existing police station structures. If not, it could be counter-
productive. For example, the WACPU, which constitutes a division within 
the Criminal Investigation department, was physically as large, and 
sometimes larger than the rest of the police station, and both WACPU and 
the police headquarters received the same number and quality of equipment. 
This means that the WACPU was privileged in comparison to the rest of the 
police station. Donors instructed the police chief how to use the WACPU 
and did not allow him to make changes to it. This conditional assistance 
caused frustration by not allowing the police chief to fully exercise his 
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authority with regard to the WACPU. The donors imposed these conditions 
in order to prevent misuse of the WACPU facility, but in practice an 
unintended consequence of the conditional assistance was to undermine the 
authority of the police chief.  
 
Another problem encountered was poor planning and lack of assessments in 
terms of equipping the WACPUs and the police stations. The equipment 
provided was mismatched to the actual needs and conditions in the country. 
In a country with almost no electricity or running water, it was not practical 
or useful to provide computers, advanced forensic equipment or even water-
closets that functioned on the basis of electrically-driven wells. A planning 
assessment could have prevented this type of mistake and waste of 
resources. 
 
With the emphasis on increasing female recruitment to the police, there was 
a need for more appropriate infrastructure at the Police Academy, including 
separate toilets, dormitories, etc. Norway built and upgraded infrastructure 
like classrooms and dormitories for the Liberian National Police Academy 
and Police Headquarters in Monrovia.  
 
Norway has also provided funding for the restructuring and training of the 
Liberian National Police, including in the managing of reported rapes and 
SGBV. Up to eleven Norwegian police officers serve in UNMIL to act as 
advisers and to cooperate with their Liberian counterparts. Recently UNMIL 
with Norwegian participation has provided advice and assistance in the 
development of the LNP strategic plan.  
 
Norway further supports the UN‟s Joint Programme for combating SGBV. It 
also funds the Norwegian Refugee Council‟s collaboration with the 
ministries for Women/Gender Issues and Development and the Ministry of 
Justice. This includes training of police recruits through role play at the 
Police Academy.  
 
Norway further funds various projects tackling SGBV implemented by the 
Norwegian Refugee Council. These projects aim to fill gaps that exist 
between actors involved in tackling GBV, such as by raising awareness and 
community capacity to refer cases of GBV to the appropriate actors. They 
also train police officers in appropriate responses to SGBV and encourage 
coordinated responses with other actors, and train judges, prosecutors and 
defence counsel on medical implications of sexual assault.   
 
Responding to a request by the SRSG, the UNDP Monrovia and Liberia‟s 
National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and 
Reintegration (NCDDRR), Norway has also contributed to a rehabilitation 
and reintegration programme for the final batch of former combatants, 
implemented by UNDP and NCDDRR. Ex-combatants and other war 
affected persons received counselling, treatment for trauma and vocational 
guidance. Small amounts of start-up funding were also made available. As 
the programme has not been evaluated yet, it is unclear how successful the 
programme has been.  
  
Finally, Norway supports efforts to facilitate access to justice and resolve 
land disputes for Liberia‟s many returnees. Around one million people were 
Marina Caparini, Kari Marie Kjellstad, Trine Nikolaisen 66 
displaced by the 1989-2003 civil war in Liberia. While most refugees and 
internally displaced people have now returned, many returnees face 
unresolved problems reclaiming their land and property. These unresolved 
land disputes are a cause of intra- and inter-communal tensions and violence, 
and prevent returnees from rebuilding their livelihoods. Through the 
Norwegian Refugee Council‟s ICLA (Information, Counselling and Legal 
Assistance) programme, Norway supports efforts to resolve land conflicts. 
ICLA seeks to facilitate land dispute resolution within the prevailing legal 
and administrative framework, builds the capacity of individuals, 
communities and institutions to resolve land dispute. The ICLA programme 
is conducted in close co-operation with Liberia‟s Land Commission, both at 
national and local level, and received around NOK 28 million over the 
period 2008-2010.  
4.7 Somalia 
Capacity and institution building in the security and justice sectors have been 
key focus areas for Norwegian assistance to Somalia. Norway helps to 
strengthen the rule of law by supporting the development of police, courts 
and prisons. Because of the piracy issue, harbour security also has become 
an area of cooperation. Norway contributes substantially to the UNDP Rule 
of Law and Security (ROLS) program, which includes training of civilian 
police officers.  
 
Somalia is widely considered a „failed state‟. Although the Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG) is internationally recognised as Somalia‟s 
legitimate government, it is weak and has not been able exercise control over 
substantial parts of the territory of the country. Piracy off the coast of 
Somalia has further contributed to the deterioration of the security situation. 
Of several smaller political entities controlling areas of territory, Somaliland 
in the north-west is one of the most stable regions in Somalia. It has 
embarked on building basic state institutions and seeks independence but has 
not been recognised internationally as a sovereign state. In the north-east, 
Puntland is weaker and also seeks to build state institutions, yet accepts the 
TFG.  
 
Norway seeks to support stability in the Horn of Africa region. Most directly 
its interests in Somalia relate to international maritime shipping, which is 
affected by piracy, and Somali refugee flows, with an increasingly large 
diaspora present in Norway.  
 
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, two-thirds of Norway‟s 
funding is dedicated to humanitarian assistance. Norwegian development 
assistance to Somalia has stood at around 250 million NOK each year since 
2007. Of this, at least 45 million NOK is allocated for Somaliland and 
Puntland.68 Norwegian assistance to Somalia has focused on four key areas: 
peace and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance, vocational training and 
education, and institution-building/capacity-building (including SSR).  
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Norway has contributed towards SSR through several means. Norway helps 
to strengthen the rule of law by supporting the development of police, courts 
and prisons, including support for a central prison for long-term prisoners in 
Somaliland. NORAD has also contributed to the development of 
Somaliland‟s Berbera Harbour port security systems and upgrading to 
international maritime standards through a Norwegian private security 
consultancy company.  
 
In 2010 Norway allocated 12.4 million NOK to the Somali security sector 
through the UNDP Rule of Law and Security (ROLS) project, which 
includes a training program for police officers. The project has trained and 
certified some 4500 civilian police officers, who are then mainly based in 
Mogadishu. Training is conducted with support from UNPOS and 
AMISOM. The police officers do not receive their salary from the local 
authorities, but receive a donor-funded stipend from UNDP which is 
supposed to function as a salary. While the end goal is to make the Somali 
government take sole responsibility for paying its police officers, it is 
unclear when this transfer of responsibility will occur. The payment of 
stipends has been a controversial issue, and in July 2008, the European 
Commission and DFID withdrew authorization for payment to the police as 
a result of allegations of human rights abuses69 and the local authorities‟ lack 
of capacity to follow up on this.    
 
Evaluations undertaken by Human Rights Watch in 200870 and Adam Smith 
International71 in 2009 have been very critical, with the latter stating that 
„funding and spending are difficult to track. Donor money may be averted 
from the original objective‟ and „the programme as a whole can only be 
considered to have delivered partially against its stated outcomes‟. The 
Norwegian government is not unaware of the risks. According to a strategy 
paper for Norwegian assistance to Somalia, assistance in Somalia is warned 
to be a high-risk project that could fail to accomplish its objectives.72  
 
SSR in the Somali context is a complex matter. Norway is simultaneously 
supporting SSR initiatives involving the central state and the self-declared 
independent territory Somaliland. Norway also supports counter-piracy 
efforts off the Somali coast. What is known about the ROLS project and 
concerns raised above suggests that without having adequate controls and 
follow up, the outcome cannot be predicted. Lacking sustainability, or a 
means for the Somali authorities to take over the payment of trained police 
salaries, it may, in the worst case, inadvertently result in unpaid trained 
police resorting to criminality or piracy. There is also a need to deal with the 
issue of non-UNDP certified police officers, who do not qualify for 
receiving stipends in the first place. Developing a strategy for engagement in 
SSR and peacebuilding in Somalia, based on a sound assessment, could help 
to clarify Norway‟s strategic objectives and develop more coherence in how 
it chooses to engage. There are obvious challenges to conduct adequate 
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evaluations as access for foreign experts inside Somalia are fraught with 
security risks. However, if Norway wishes to support SSR in such a sensitive 
region, ongoing monitoring and evaluation are essential if one is to avoid 
potentially counterproductive results of assistance to SSR.  
4.8 Sudan and South Sudan 
Implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and capacity 
building in South Sudan have constituted the main pillars of Norwegian 
engagement in Sudan and the new state of South Sudan. Norway provided 
NOK 65 million for UNDP‟s Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration 
(DDR) programme in 2009-2010, and provides support to the justice sector 
through several UNDP programs and through the Norwegian Refugee 
Council. 
 
Norway is a substantial contributor to police reform, predominantly in South 
Sudan. Several Norwegian police officers are currently seconded to UNMIS 
(UN Mission in Sudan), and a trilateral police-training program is 
undertaken with South Africa as the implementing actor.  
 
Since the 2005 CPA, Norway has played a prominent role in providing 
broad-ranging political and economic support to the parties to facilitate its 
implementation. It has also been providing humanitarian assistance. Sudan 
was in 2010 the third largest recipient of Norwegian development aid, 
receiving 732 million NOK in bilateral assistance, and this strong 
commitment is expected to continue. Most Norwegian contributions in terms 
of long-term assistance are channelled through Multi Donor Trust Funds, 
which are vehicles that seek to harmonise donors and improve the 
effectiveness of international aid, with a strong emphasis on national 
ownership. Norway is a member of the Joint Donor Office (JDO), 
established since 2006 in Juba, which seeks to coordinate development 
assistance between major donors, also including the UK, Netherlands, 
Sweden, Denmark, and Canada. Over 50 percent of Norway‟s development 
assistance is channelled through multilateral organizations, including UN 
agencies, particularly UNDP, as well as UNICEF and UNHCR, the ICRC 
and World Bank. Norwegian NGOs are also major channels of Norway‟s 
development assistance, accounting for 30 percent in 2009 and 20 percent in 
2010.  
 
The main thematic areas of focus for Norwegian aid in 2010 were 
peacebuilding and democratic development, capacity building for all of 
Sudan and state-building for the South in particular, basic social services, 
and humanitarian assistance. Norway has supported a number of 
programmes for local peacebuilding, democratic institutions, and for security 
and justice, including police training. While security sector reform has not 
been a main priority for Norway in Sudan since 2005, it has been involved in 
a number of important initiatives, and the sheer volume of Norwegian 
development assistance to Sudan means that its contributions even to a non-
priority area such as SSR have not been insignificant. There have been 
indications from the government that Norwegian support to what will 
become the new state of South Sudan will focus increasingly on SSR as a 
core dimension of state-building.  
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For several years Norway has been supporting a disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) for both North- and South-Sudan. 
This programme is nationally-led, but UNDP functions as Norway‟s partner 
and manages the reintegration dimension. In 2010 Norway provided 15 
million NOK for DDR in Sudan, and provided a further 1.4 million NOK for 
gender technical assistance to the Southern Sudan DDR Commission. The 
UNDP DDR programme experienced significant problems, and at the 
prompting of major donors, a new DDR strategy has been developed. This 
programme is likely to undergo changes with the dividing of the state and 
upon a review of the programme. 
 
Norway provides considerable funding for UNDP‟s Community Security & 
Arms Control (CSAC) Programme in Eastern Sudan, South Sudan and North 
Sudan. It has also supported UNDP‟s Governance and Rule of Law 
Programme with NOK 35 million in 2009-2010. 
 
Norway has to date supported several SSR initiatives focused on capacity 
building of what is to become the new state of South Sudan, primarily in 
police reform.  
 
Norway contributes to police reform in South Sudan through UNMIS (UN 
Mission in Sudan) with 9 police officers deployed there, involved in training, 
community policing coordination, and protection of vulnerable groups. The 
number will increase until 2012 when South Sudan is declared an 
independent state.  
 
Norway provided support to the South Sudan Police Service (SPSS) for 
„training of trainers‟ preceding the April 2010 elections and the referendum 
in January 2011. This training was conducted in close collaboration with 
UNMIS Police. It should also be noted that Norway was able to respond 
quickly to urgent calls for funding to feed SPSS officers who were 
responsible for providing security in the run-up to the referendum. As the 
police were not being fed, some had already begun to return home due to the 
lack of food.    
 
Norway has also financed strategic seminars for the top management of the 
SSPS. Conducted in close collaboration with UNMIS Police, these seminars 
resulted in the preparation of SPSS‟ strategic long-term plan.  
 
Norway has also contributed to the building of infrastructure at the Dr. John 
Garang Unified Police Training Centre at Rejaf. Specifically this has 
included the building of dormitories for women.  
 
Another police reform project is a police training programme for the police 
in North and South Sudan as well as in Darfur. This is a bilateral Norwegian 
project agreed jointly with South Africa in 2009. Norway‟s Embassy in 
Pretoria allocated 45 million NOK to the South African police for them to 
help build a functioning and democratic police in Sudan through police 
training. The South African Police Service (SAPS) is responsible for actual 
training, with around 30 percent of programme resources to be implemented 
in the North/Darfur and 70 percent in South Sudan. This programme has 
reportedly encountered major challenges which has resulted in a one year 
delay in implementation since the signing of the contract in 2009. UNMIS 
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has the overall mandate for police reform in South Sudan, but South African 
police coordination with UNMIS on the training component has been 
lacking. Due to the lack of progress, the Norwegian Police Directorate was 
asked by the MFA to monitor the project. POD now provides technical 
assistance in the form of personnel who travel regularly to Juba to follow up 
on the project. The program still faces challenges but has conducted three 
training sessions and developed an updated revolving training schedule for 
the rest of the programme period. 
 
As noted above, Norway is considering increasing its contributions to SSR 
in Southern Sudan and has already supported numerous police training and 
reform initiatives. In view of being already involved with the SPSS, Norway 
should consider continuing to engage with police reform while exploring 
other potential areas of engagement. With careful planning, monitoring and 
coordination with local actor, problems such as those encountered in the 
cooperative project with South Africa can be mitigated in future. It should 
also consider continuing gaps in donor assistance to state-building and SSR 
Southern Sudan, such as oversight and accountability systems for both the 
SPSS and the SPLA, or development of the formal justice sector.   
4.9 Afghanistan 
Norway pledged 750 million NOK in combined humanitarian and 
development aid to Afghanistan for each year from 2008-2012. 
Development aid is focused on three sectors: good governance with 
particular emphasis on strengthening the police and justice sector; education; 
and livelihood. Humanitarian assistance includes health, mine clearance, 
refugees and human rights. Additionally, Norway has undertaken to intensify 
its commitment to UNSC 1325 (2000) in Afghanistan, in recognition of 
women‟s rights as a crosscutting priority in all Norwegian development 
activities in Afghanistan.  
 
In 2009, some 32 percent of Norwegian assistance to Afghanistan was 
channelled through the World Bank multi-donor Afghanistan Reconstruction 
Trust Fund (ARTF). Through ARTF Norway supported the National Justice 
Programme, which sought to improve the capacity of the Supreme Court, the 
courts of law, the prosecuting authority and the justice ministry.73 In 2010 
Norway committed to contribute a total of NOK 900 million to the ARTF 
over three years, including NOK 285 million for 2010 and 2011 and NOK 
330 million for 2012. ARTF funding is not earmarked for specific projects, 
programmes or geographical areas. Norway also supports the UN-
administered Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) with 
NOK 85.1 million in 2009-2010, and the disarmament and disbandment of 
illegal armed groups (DIAG) with NOK 17 million.  
 
According to the Parliamentary Report Number 9 (2007-8), Afghanistan is 
one of the priority countries in which Norway contributes to SSR, primarily 
through the training of the Afghan National Army (ANA).74 This 
contribution is linked explicitly to its participation in the NATO-led 
International Stabilization Assistance Force (ISAF) through the Operational 
Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) that advises an Afghan brigade in 
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Mazar-e-Sharif and the OMLT Kandak based in Faryab province. Gradually 
the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Faryab has also become more 
intimately involved in capacity building with the Afghan National Security 
Forces (ANSF). PRTs are part of ISAF‟s concept of operations, and their 
mission is „to assist the Government of Afghanistan to extend its authority in 
order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment…and 
enable security sector reform (SSR) and reconstruction efforts.‟75 SSR has 
also been viewed by Norwegian officials as an essential means of 
„Afghanization‟: assisting the Afghan government „to build up its own 
police, courts, prosecutors, defence ministries and other public institutions in 
this area‟ and ensuring that „all security forces should be subject to 
democratic civilian control.‟76  
 
According to the comprehensive „strategy‟ for Faryab, the Norwegian 
military presence would gradually shift more and more to a mentoring, 
partnering and supporting role as the Afghan National Security Forces take 
over responsibility for security. As Afghan capacity increases, the 
Norwegian mentoring role will increase to both Afghan army and police 
units. 77 Recognising that the police and justice sectors were lagging behind 
building up of the armed forces, Norway also agreed to put in place a police 
mentoring team at provincial and district level for the Afghan National 
Police in Faryab. This mentoring team includes both civilian police advisers 
and military police. Norway also has had prison advisers based in Faryab, 
providing advice on prison construction and reform. Norway also has 
provided funds to build a new prison in the provincial capital Meymaneh.  
 
The Norwegian PRT in Afghanistan has two components. The military 
component is responsible for providing security and facilitating development 
and reconstruction. It is also increasingly involved in partnering and training 
of the ANA. The civilian component generally consists of several elements, 
including development (through four NGOs, including Norwegian Church 
Aid and Norwegian Refugee Council); police officers who engage with the 
Afghan National Police and strengthen it through training, mentoring, and 
mapping equipment and resource needs);  prison officers (2 corrections 
officers, who monitor the rule of law, including safety and human rights of 
prisoners, completed their mission in early 2011); and civilian advisers who 
monitor and collect information and report on the political and development 
situation (currently 3 individuals: one civilian coordinator, a development 
aid coordinator and a political adviser, who together constitute the Embassy 
office in Meymaneh). The military component of the PRT is under ISAF 
command, while civilians are under a different chain of command, whether 
EUPOL or national command. In practice, the coordination between military 
and civilian components was reported to be problematic.  
 
Norway currently has 500 military deployed to ISAF and several dozen 
civilians, including the police advisers in Meymaneh, including 23 police 
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advisers, 7 in Kabul and 16 in Meymaneh, Faryab.78 Norway will continue 
providing troops to the PRT at least until 2012, placing an increasing 
emphasis on training, mentoring and partnering with Afghan security forces 
to enable the overall transfer of security responsibility to them. Currently the 
military component is concentrating on enabling the Afghan National 
Security Forces to handle the security situation in Faryab, focusing on the 
Afghan National Army, 1st brigade, 209
th
 Corps. Norway‟s special forces 
have also done mentoring and training of a special police unit in Kabul, 
which is now seen as one of the best units in the Afghan security forces. This 
training was done without the participation of the Norwegian police. The 
main focus of Norway‟s contribution to police reform is providing advice, 
training and expertise to building up the police in Faryab province via the 
EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL). From this year, Norway‟s 
police contributions are expected to be increasingly concentrated 
geographically in Faryab.  
 
Norway contributes police officers in both bilateral and multilateral settings, 
across three different organizations: the UN Mission to Afghanistan 
(UNAMA); the EU Police in Afghanistan (EUPOL-A); and the bilateral 
police project Norway-Afghanistan (NORAF). In an effort to avoid 
excessive fragmentation of the police contribution, Norway has attempted to 
concentrate more of its police reform assistance efforts in Faryab, where the 
majority are now located.  
 
One reportedly successful element of NORAF Kabul has been the 
assignment of two police officers to the Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF), 
a department under the Counter Narcotics Police Afghanistan (CNPA). 
CJTF consists of detectives, district attorneys and judges who work on 
investigations for major drug cases from all over the country. Within the 
formal Afghan justice system, counter-narcotics has its own „chain of 
justice‟, with dedicated courts and a prison (for custody only). The CJTF are 
assessed to have achieved a high level of expertise and good quality police 
work. A number of cases have been successfully investigated, prosecuted 
and ended with convictions. The CJTF is viewed as a possible model for 
other specialised areas of investigation, such as the new anti-corruption unit. 
Counter-narcotics assistance is led by the UK. Norway‟s police contribution 
to the CJTF was perceived by some respondents as a niche bilateral 
contribution where Norway has been able to offer specific expertise in a 
context that has resulted in real impact. Norway also gains from such 
cooperation, as its police learn more about the heroin trade in the region and 
how it is transported to the West. (Norway also contributed two judges and 
two legal experts from the Attorney General‟s office to act as mentors on 
counter-narcotics justice processes to Afghan counterparts. See below).  
 
Another important project under the bilateral NORAF Kabul is the „Female 
Project‟, a Norwegian initiative that began in 2008 involving three police 
officers who provide professional support and coaching to the female 
general of police who has responsibility for gender, human rights and child 
abuse. The project also provides support to Afghan policewomen through a 
Safety Awareness Course (SAC), which trains female police officers in self-
                                                     
78  Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs, „Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre‟s address to the 
Storting on the situation in Afghanistan and Norway‟s civilian and military engagement‟, 
26 April 2011, available at: http://www.regjeringen.no 
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defence. The project also provides strategic counselling to female police 
officers on professional interaction with male colleagues and leadership 
skills. This project has been viewed with interest by international observers 
and key donors are looking to establish similar projects. 
 
Norway‟s contribution to UNAMA consists of a police officer as police 
adviser. The police adviser works as adviser to the SRSG regarding police 
matters, and with him takes part in the Senior Police Adviser Group (SPAG) 
in Kabul, where strategic decisions concerning the police are taken.  
 
Norway‟s contribution to EUPOL in Kabul consists of an officer located at 
the EU HQ who works with gender and human rights, responsible for 
training and education in the Ministry of Interior. This training is aimed at 
management, and is provided at the Afghan Police Academy in Kabul, 
among other places. 
 
Norway maintains police contributions in Meymaneh, Faryab province, 
currently 4 for the bilateral NORAF projects and 11 for multilateral 
deployment with EUPOL-A. The NORAF project in Faryab involves 
Norwegian police working with Norwegian military police in a Police 
Operational Mentoring Liaison Team (POMLT). Together the Norwegian 
police and military police conduct training and mentoring in Afghan police 
stations and police checkpoints. It is worth noting that the Norwegian 
civilian police recognise that because of the few numbers of police brought 
in by the international community to conduct police reform, they need 
assistance from the military to be able to move around the province for 
security reasons. However, they are uncomfortable with military police 
sharing responsibility for training what is supposed to be a civilian Afghan 
police. They are also concerned that the local community does not perceive a 
difference between the military and police contingents within the PRT. 
While the Norwegian military police received some police training, and 
some of the military police have worked as police officers in Norway, all of 
the military police were recruited by the military for Afghanistan. Those 
Norwegian civilian police consequently feel it is important not to be part of 
the military, but to maintain a distinct professional police team identity 
within the PRT.  
 
EUPOL has a City Police Justice Programme (CPJP) based in Kabul, but 
which has been extended to the four largest cities in Afghanistan. One of 
these cities is Mazar-e-Sharif. Since the Norwegian-led PRT is based in 
Faryab, Norway wanted the police officers seconded to EUPOL to stay in 
Meymaneh at the PRT camp. Thus the police officers do police training in 
Meymaneh. In Meymaneh the Norwegian police provide training for the 
local police in firearms, investigation, forensics, human rights, self-defence, 
and driving lessons. There is also an initiative to start a CPJP in Meymaneh, 
which would enable the Norwegian police officers seconded to EUPOL to 
concentrate their efforts in Meymaneh.    
 
Norway has also engaged in limited interventions in justice sector reform in 
Afghanistan. From September 2005 until 2008 Norway deployed several 
legal and justice sector advisers from the Stykebrønnen (Rule of Law Pool of 
Experts) to Afghanistan. Four (two prosecutors and two judges, and after a 
year a defence attorney) were based in Kabul, engaged as mentors for the 
Marina Caparini, Kari Marie Kjellstad, Trine Nikolaisen 74 
Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF), with a special emphasis on counter-
narcotics prosecution service and court. In 2007 a separate project was 
established with two representatives from the Norwegian Prison Service who 
were based in Meymaneh, responsible for mapping, mentoring and assisting 
the development of prison quality and respect for human rights in the prisons 
of the province. The Kabul-based part of the Rule of Law Pool mission 
ended in late 2008, and only the prison advisers in Meymaneh stayed on 
until January 2011. Although the Kabul Rule of Law Pool mission had 
apparently started well, response from the Embassy was varying, and 
increasingly negative. The team appeared to become increasingly detached 
from Norwegian priorities in Afghan development assistance.79 Other 
reasons were also cited, including six-month deployments which were too 
short to establish trusting relationships with counterparts, and the criticism 
that focusing on counter-narcotics courts could legitimate the extensive 
corruption in this field. However the main reason appears to be that the 
mission started to pursue a strategy of engagement on justice reform that was 
independently arrived at yet which had wider implications for Norwegian 
foreign policy. An appraisal conducted by NORAD and published in 2010 
counselled against the establishment of a follow-on Rule of Law Pool 
mission in Faryab due to an unclear concept for how such a programme 
would operate in practice, concerns about the qualifications of staff 
(specifically expertise on Afghan and Islamic judicial issues), and the need 
to ensure the security of its personnel, which links such a programme 
directly to the future of the Norwegian-led PRT.80 
 
Although a Norwegian police contingent and members of the Norwegian 
Rule of Law Pool of Advisers were both working to support the CJTF, there 
was no formal cooperation between these elements. In view of the close 
relationship between police investigation and the prosecution‟s handling of 
drug cases at the CJTF, close cooperation could and should have been 
developed among the respective groups of Norwegian advisers.  
 
The preceding discussion confirms that Afghanistan has been a large 
engagement for Norway. However, its engagement has been criticised as 
being „supply-driven‟ (from the Norwegian side) rather than demand-driven 
(derived from an Afghan needs assessment). Also it has been described by 
one respondent as based on a „political decision‟ rather than on the usual 
assessment and planning procedures. The lack of planning was generally 
seen as a major cause of problems. The failure to do proper assessments as a 
basis for Norwegian involvement was, according to one observer in the 
development community, a result of the desire for Norway‟s development 
assistance funds to equal its military expenditures in Afghanistan. Most of 
the money has been channelled through the World Bank administered ARTF 
trust fund and UNDP administered LOTFA trust fund. One issue is whether 
the money has been handled properly by the trust funds. The other issue is 
whether the outcome on the ground is a good one and the intended outcome.   
 
The „political‟ nature of Norway‟s engagement in Afghanistan also has had 
implications for the process of providing assistance. In development 
cooperation, it is usually the MFA with its embassies and NORAD that 
                                                     
79  NORAD, Appraisal of Extended Rule of Law Project in Faryab, Afghanistan, NORAD 
Report 19/2010 Discussion (October 2010), p. 8.  
80  NORAD, „Appraisal of Extended Rule of Law Project‟, pp. 20-21.  
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handle the funds and operational interventions. However Afghanistan 
constitutes a special case where other ministries, in particular the Ministry of 
Defence, have played a prominent role (although not on administering 
development funds). While the Norwegian Embassies on the ground has 
overall responsibility for coordinating development aid efforts, as is the case 
generally, in Afghanistan, the main difference being that in Afghanistan 
development engagement has been closely linked to the overall political 
agenda for the engagement.  
 
Although Norwegian officials have framed the country‟s engagement in 
Afghanistan as supporting SSR among other objectives, it is important to 
note that several people whom we interviewed disagreed that Norway has 
been engaging in SSR in Afghanistan, or were sceptical whether Norway‟s 
efforts constituted SSR, insofar as SSR adopts a holistic perspective which 
requires understanding the interdependencies between the different elements. 
Based on that understanding of SSR, one can better understand why several 
respondents maintained that Norway is not yet engaged in SSR in 
Afghanistan, and that SSR is not yet part of the coalition strategy for 
engagement. While there is reconstruction, this is conducted largely by the 
military, and moreover without the concern for long-term sustainability that 
SSR implies.  
 
Norway‟s engagement in Afghanistan has also seen a more conscious 
attempt to coordinate efforts among relevant actors. On the initiative of then 
State Secretary for Defence, Espen Barth Eide, the Afghanistan Forum was 
established. This is a regular meeting at both the political (state secretary) 
level and at bureaucratic (ministry) level that brings together all ministries 
engaged in Afghanistan, in the interest of developing a more coordinated and 
integrated national approach.81 This mechanism has focused ongoing 
attention on Afghanistan across government, and provides guidance and 
coordination at the strategic level (although not necessarily at operational 
level on the ground). And in 2009 Norway developed a document that 
established a minimum common platform for civilian and military efforts in 
Faryab province, where the Norwegian-led PRT is located. The PRT in 
Meymaneh, Faryab province, consists of a military and civilian component, 
although the civilian component is part of the embassy in Kabul. It does not 
implement development projects of its own; funds are channelled via the 
World Bank, UN and NGOs according to programmes reflecting Afghan 
national priorities and the recommendations of the PRT.82  
                                                     
81  Cedric de Coning, Helge Lurås, Niels Nagelhus Schia and Ståle Ulriksen, Norway’s 
Whole-of-Government Approach and its Engagement with Afghanistan, NUPI, Security in 
Practice 8 (2009), 25-26.  
82  ‟Norwegian led PRT in Faryab‟.  
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5. Key Findings and Recommendations 
5.1 Key Findings 
Engaging with SSR constitutes an important instrument for furthering 
some of Norway’s key foreign policy objectives and national values, in 
particular its support of peacebuilding, good governance, democratization 
and the rule of law in countries emerging from authoritarian rule or conflict. 
It is also a means of reinforcing the message that Norway is a good ally, able 
and willing to contribute in terms of defence diplomacy and supporting the 
development of effective, legitimate and accountable security and justice 
sectors in partner states.    
 
While it has proven challenging to determine overall levels of funding 
provided by Norway towards SSR, figures drawn from functional sectors 
and data from country programmes suggest that Norway is in the group of 
primary donors supporting SSR.  
 
Norway supports diverse SSR projects in various countries on a bilateral and 
multilateral basis, but this engagement often appears to be in ‘bits and 
pieces’ as a consequence of the decentralized and rather fragmented 
nature of project development, funding and implementation of SSR 
assistance by Norway.  
 
Although several brief passages regarding SSR have appeared in various 
policy statements and documents, there is no overall strategic policy 
framework for Norway’s engagement with SSR. There has also been little 
planning guidance for SSR programming with one significant exception: 
the joint MFA-MOD SSR strategy devised for the Western Balkans 
2010-2014. Other guidance documents have been much more limited in 
scope, including a 2006 guide was issued for DSSR in Serbia, and a 
„strategy‟ (common platform) for civilian and military elements of the PRT 
in Faryab. The Western Balkans joint MFA-MOD joint strategy a strategy 
document, but is limited to two ministries and applies only to the military 
and defence dimension.  
 
In consequence of the absence of broad policy guidance, SSR projects have 
tended to be initiated, developed and implemented within each functional 
sector – i.e. within and by the defence, policing, and justice sectors, with the 
MFA‟s country desk officers and embassy officials supporting projects 
directly through funding and in theory keeping a broad overview of 
engagement. SSR engagement tends to be segmented, with lack of 
coordination among components, and the absence of a more holistic 
understanding of where these projects fit within the broader SSR 
processes within those countries.  
 
Generally, in the development of a donor‟s bilateral SSR programming, each 
relevant government department has a distinct perspective, logic and 
objectives, which may make interdepartmental coordination challenging. 
The relatively small numbers of individuals involved working on SSR-
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related issues in government ministries in Oslo and on Norwegian-funded 
projects in the field is recognized as facilitating informal communication and 
information-sharing between personnel in different departments. Although 
being a small country has its virtues in a smaller administration and policy 
elite who are more likely to know one another, this does not, however, fully 
compensate for the lack of systematic interdepartmental coordination or 
development of joint approaches in defence, policing and justice sector 
assistance to SSR in recipient countries, which could enhance coherence 
and effectiveness of assistance.  
 
There also appeared to be a lack of awareness that SSR entailed both 
operational effectiveness and accountable governance of security and justice 
systems. While individuals appeared very knowledgeable about reforms in 
their particular sector, some also appeared to lack understanding of whether 
the activities in which they were engaged constituted SSR.  
 
Developing a strategic policy framework could help further a common 
understanding of the broad goals of SSR, the interconnectedness of the 
security and justice systems, and foster a more coherent approach 
across the various Norwegian governmental and non-governmental 
actors involved in the many aspects of supporting SSR processes.  
 
One important feature of the current Norwegian approach is the high degree 
of flexibility foreign policy actors (ministry and embassy officials) enjoy 
concerning which SSR projects to support. The ability to react quickly and 
with financial flexibility is widely agreed to be a distinct advantage for 
Norway.   
 
Norway’s comparative advantages include its international profile as a 
consistently generous donor as indicated by the significant size of its 
development assistance budget and proven commitment to maintaining a 
consistently high level of ODA; its international image as an honest 
broker and not having an overt agenda attached to its assistance, or a 
colonial history with its negative associations in countries and regions in 
which it provides assistance, as well as its role in international conflict 
mediation; and its nimbleness, or the flexibility of its funding and its 
capacity to react quickly to changing requirements.  
 
Norway has shown commitment to multilateralism, by prioritizing support 
of the development of UN and regional organizations‟ capacities in SSR, and 
by participating in multidonor trust funds and multilateral SSR projects. 
 
In terms of bilateral assistance, Norway appears best able to apply its 
resources and advantages in contexts where major powers are not 
dominant and do not have strong interests. It frequently appeared that the 
provision of bilateral Norwegian SSR assistance was more effective in 
country contexts or on topics where such openings existed, and provided 
more visibility for Norway. 
 
Certain Norwegian actors we interviewed also voiced a preference for 
engaging in SSR assistance in contexts commensurate with Norway‟s size; 
large countries were perceived as offering less chance of achieving the 
desired impact. While the possibility of a joint SSR initiative with a like-
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minded donor(s) has been mooted in some contexts, to date cooperation with 
Nordic/other donor countries in providing country-specific SSR assistance 
has been very limited.  
 
Some specific capacities that Norway offers include expertise in defence 
management and civilian control, developing strong community-police 
relations, expertise and practical experience in gender mainstreaming, the 
capacity to address several inter-related components of judicial reform 
through team deployments of national experts, well crafted reintegration 
programmes, and facilitating access to justice and legal empowerment for 
the displaced and other marginalised or vulnerable populations.  
 
The use of Norwegian civil servants and uniformed police and military to 
deliver mentoring and training in functional areas of defence, intelligence, 
policing and justice also confers an advantage. While certain donors have 
turned increasingly towards the use of private contractors, consultancy 
companies and non-governmental organizations for the delivery of such 
assistance, and while outsourcing offers extra flexibility to donors, it remains 
common to hear a preference among recipient countries for their security and 
justice sector personnel to be trained and mentored by their counterparts in 
donor countries. Retaining military-to-military assistance and police-to-
police assistance also avoids the depoliticization of SSR assistance that 
tends to occur with outsourcing.  
 
Norway also gains from having its civil servants and security personnel 
participating in security sector reform initiatives. International experience 
exposes Norwegian personnel to new perspectives and experiences, and 
brings them into contact with local counterparts who may later prove to 
be useful contacts for Norway.  
 
In places where Norway has provided significant support to SSR, it has 
often had an important impact on the development of more effective and 
well governed security and justice institutions through locally-owned 
and sustainable processes of institutional and human capacity building. 
For example, experiences in Serbian police reform, Bosnian intelligence 
reform, reintegration programmes in Bosnia and Serbia, and Montenegrin 
defence management development, and justice sector reform in Georgia and 
Moldova involved careful attention to close consultation and 
development of projects in cooperation with local partners, sound 
planning, effective implementation, and usually some form of 
monitoring or assessment.  
 
Even in contexts where Norway has not specifically prioritized SSR, as in 
Sudan and Southern Sudan to date, Norway has been an important and 
influential actor. This is due in part to the high levels of development 
assistance it provides generally; Norway often carries weight in SSR in 
effect even if not by specific intent.   
 
Norwegian contributions to defence-related SSR (DSSR) have benefitted 
from the dual funding streams available to it according to whether activities 
are ODA-eligible or not. The ability to provide direct military training and 
assistance to another state‟s military can be vitally important to an SSR 
process. Norway also has good experience in building capacity, training, and 
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facilitating reform of police in post-authoritarian and post-conflict 
environments. Compared to defence and policing, Norway has been less 
active in contributing to justice sector reform; the deployment of a team 
from Rule of Law Pool of Advisers to Georgia and Moldova was judged 
very successful, while in Afghanistan it was seen to have mixed results. 
Although Norway has had limited engagement in assisting intelligence 
reform through SSR processes, its experience in Bosnia through a NUPI-
administered programme is considered to have been very successful, and it 
also contributes to parliamentary capacity building in Kosovo and the 
Western Balkans on intelligence and security issues. 
 
On the non-governmental level, efforts by the Norwegian Refugee Council 
to facilitate land dispute resolution and access to justice, whether formal or 
customary, are important yet not widely recognized as contributions to 
justice components of SSR.   
 
In bilateral assistance projects, we heard of several cases of careful dialogue 
with local actors, needs assessment, good planning and effective 
implementation. This was not always the case, however, and it emerged that 
there is a need for better assessments and planning of SSR projects. 
Monitoring and evaluation of major or long-running projects 
supporting SSR should also be conducted.  
 
The Styrkebrønnen is a unique Norwegian instrument for contributing 
to SSR which embodies a number of strengths. Justice nevertheless 
remains something of a weak link in Norwegian SSR support. Despite 
the recognition of interdependence or a „chain of justice‟ linking the policing 
and justice sectors and SSR‟s emphasis on a holistic approach in which both 
sectors are engaged, Norway‟s efforts to date have remained largely 
segmented, with strong emphasis on assisting police reform, a lesser 
emphasis on the justice sector, and almost no joint or coordinated assistance 
linking policing and justice initiatives.  
 
Norway has a strong commitment to multilateral engagement. However, we 
heard of several cases in which international organizations running large 
SSR programmes supported by Norway have failed to observe good practice 
in terms of adequate needs assessment and/or flawed implementation of 
projects. UNDP programmes in Liberia and Somalia were mentioned in this 
regard. Given the emphasis that Norway places on providing assistance 
through multilateral channels, further consideration should be given to 
ensuring that Norway exercises due diligence when deciding whether to 
fund large multilateral programmes, initiating its own needs 
assessments and monitoring when these appear inadequately prepared 
by the implementing organization, and what remedial measures Norway as 
a major donor can take if it becomes apparent that a large multilateral project 
is encountering serious difficulty.  
 
Generally we find that there is a lack of follow up and evaluation of the 
results of SSR activities. This is an important responsibility for Norway 
and other donors engaged in SSR because of the serious consequences of 
flawed or failed support to security and justice system reform for 
citizens, for the legitimacy of the state, and often in terms of regional 
stability. 
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5.2 Recommendations 
 
Recommendation 1: Develop a more coherent and coordinated 
Norwegian approach to SSR 
 Norway should consider developing a strategic policy framework for 
its engagement in security sector reform. This should be informed by 
further study of Norwegian experiences, resources and lessons 
learned in SSR, and set out broad objectives and mechanisms for 
coordination. 
 
 The development of a joint MFA-MOD strategy for SSR support to 
the Western Balkans is a positive development in which common 
objectives were identified, enhancing effectiveness of engagement. 
Another positive development was the creation of the DSSR unit in 
NDUC. Further institutionalization of coordination mechanisms is 
suggested. 
 
 Norway could consider focusing on niche capacities – i.e. what it is 
really good at and what it can sustain for extended periods. This 
study has suggested while there is a high level of expertise and 
capacity across the security and justice sectors, Norway could focus 
particularly on training and mentoring by defence and police 
personnel, including the Coast Guard; Styrkebrønnen (the pool of 
deployable experts on the chain of justice); the focus on women‟s 
equality and gender sensitivity.  
 
 The capacity to respond quickly to opportunities with flexible 
funding constitutes a distinct advantage for Norway. However the 
development of a more coordinated approach is also recommended 
in view of the current decentralization. More thinking is needed 
about how to retain a good margin of flexibility whilst also 
enhancing coordination and coherence of Norway‟s support to SSR 
processes.  
 
 Due to its very strong support for and international identification 
with the gender policy issue in SSR and other related peacebuilding 
areas, Norway should consider developing a more active and direct 
role in shaping developments in gender and SSR at both the 
conceptual and practical levels. This could entail, for example, 
involving Norwegian professional security sector practitioners in 
reviewing and assessing the tools, policy guides and training 
materials being produced with its funding, which is a continuing 
lacuna in current approaches.  
 
 Norway has multiple civilian expert rosters on which it draws to 
second individuals to the UN and other multilateral agencies for 
crisis management operations as well as bilaterally in support of 
post-conflict peacebuilding tasks. As these rosters are frequently 
used in the context of Norwegian support to SSR, it would be useful 
at this point for Norway to assess how rosters and secondment 
practices contribute to the achievement of Norwegian policy 
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objectives, the impact of secondments on local reform processes, 
and costs and benefits to Norway of seconding experts compared to 
other types of engagement, such as developing local capacity in 
recipient countries. There is also the question of what strategic 
vision governs Norway‟s use of civilian expert rosters, and whether 
the fielding of civilian capabilities can be done in a way that is more 
strategic and coherent rather than reactive and ad hoc. If reliance on 
rosters and deploying experts is maintained, more attention should 
be paid to how the experience and insights gained by seconded 
personnel can be fed back into the policy cycle and used to inform 
and improve planning processes.  
 
 
Recommendation 2: Develop greater knowledge and raise 
awareness about SSR across government and among the 
Norwegian public 
 Various actors, including those in the development community, 
appear to lack basic knowledge about SSR. We perceive a need for 
greater cross-government sensitization about SSR; what it is, what is 
the value-added of an SSR perspective; and how it can be 
undertaken on a practical level.  
 
 Norwegians already involved in SSR training or mentoring or 
deployed abroad on SSR-related missions or projects are also not 
always adequately informed about what SSR is, or how their specific 
efforts relate to the broader picture. There is a need to identify those 
who would benefit from SSR training, and to provide it to them 
before they begin their deployment.  
 
 There is also a need to share the respective insights and experiences 
of the various actors in supporting SSR in a more systematized way, 
and in this way contribute to a more coherent and coordinated 
Norwegian approach as outlined in Recommendation 1.  
 
Recommendation 3: Improve project planning and conduct more 
assessments, monitoring and evaluations 
 There is a need for more planning, monitoring and assessment, and 
evaluation of SSR to be conducted in Norway. This will make it 
easier for Norwegians deployed abroad to work on SSR to tap into 
knowledge and insights, and should result in stronger, more effective 
support to SSR.  
 
 Norway should seek to adopt an evidence-based approach to SSR 
policy which would entail developing policy frameworks from 
assessments, monitoring and evaluation, and research findings.  
 
 Norway also should think more about how to better connect 
research, policy and practice of SSR. Norway should build up 
stronger institutional links among relevant departments and 
organizations, and identify a forum for exchange and discussion on 
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SSR and other inter-disciplinary, multidimensional peacebuilding 
activities that it supports.  
 
 Norway has an interest in publishing the results of research and 
evaluations of SSR projects that it supports. This can feed 
information back into Norwegian and international project 
development and programming.  
 
 Norway could consider the creation of a cross-governmental unit, 
working group, or an „integrated hub‟ on SSR that focuses on 
ensuring mutual understanding between relevant departments and a 
more coherent and coordinated approach to SSR assistance. Such a 
unit would help to ensure that political goals underlying SSR 
assistance as articulated by the MFA are operationalized in specific 
functional sectors (MOD, MOJ, POD). This could also include a role 
for Norwegian research institutes and NGOs that contribute to 
Norwegian assistance to SSR.  
 
 The administrative infrastructures for Norwegian governmental 
departments engaging in SSR projects in general tend to be under-
resourced. In order to properly oversee projects and to evaluate the 
achievements of completed projects Norway should discuss how to 
resolve problems with understaffing and corresponding limited 
capacity to oversee SSR projects.     
 
 Police training must be useful and tailored to the conditions and 
capacities of the local police. There should also be more attention to 
following up training through monitoring and checking to see 
whether those trained are actually implementing what they learned 
in practice and in the field. We recommend more focus on assessing 
the outcome of training and on follow-up.  
 
 We identify a need for more follow-up in Norway of police, 
military, security and civilian experts who have returned home from 
international deployments in SSR contexts. International experience 
enrichens personnel and strengthens Norwegian capacities when 
those individuals return. But there does not appear to be a strong 
system of debriefing returning personnel, i.e., of systematically 
compiling the knowledge and experience of returnees in any of the 
sectors we surveyed. Knowledge-sharing, when it occurs, is often 
initiated by individuals themselves (e.g. an individual returning from 
being deployed abroad may offer to hold a briefing seminar for 
colleagues). The knowledge, insights and experiences of 
Norwegians who have worked abroad on SSR projects should be 
collected more systematically, analysed, and fed back into policy 
processes.  
 
 As Norway is likely to become increasingly involved in SSR in 
Africa, it will be necessary to conduct effective fact-finding 
missions. This will require sending a multi-disciplinary team. 
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Documentation of methods and lessons learned, insights and 
experiences in implementing SSR programmes or projects.  
 
 Although Norway has a strong commitment to maintaining a high 
level of ODA and is in a stronger position than many other donors in 
the current financial environment, this does not obviate the need to 
ensure that money is effectively spent and that projects have the 
desired impact. Norway already has a strong culture of evaluation of 
assistance projects, but value-for-money auditing is not as strong. 
Norway should consider developing greater competence on 
determining whether money used for specific SSR activities is being 
well used. This would entail part of a general strengthening of 
evaluation, monitoring and assessment of SSR projects.   
 
 
Recommendation 4: Enhance international coordination on SSR 
 A proactively holistic approach also extends to cooperation with 
partners. Norway has shown itself willing on the ground to respond 
to efforts to coordinate among donors, for example. However rather 
than being reactive, Norway could take a more proactive and 
systemic approach towards coordination. This was seen in Bosnia 
and Serbia, for example, when as lead nation on a key reintegration 
programme Norway took on an informal coordinating role among 
the donors. But in other contexts Norway has been less proactive 
and has responded to requests by other donors to increase 
coordination of efforts. Emphasizing a more holistic approach to 
SSR domestically may well have this effect on Norway‟s 
interactions with partners, where it takes the initiative for 
coordination rather reacting to others‟ requests for it.     
 
 As an example of initiating enhanced international coordination in 
DSSR and as suggested by one respondent, Norway could propose 
the establishment of a clearinghouse role within NATO in which 
member states can inform their allies about what they are doing to 
support SSR and where this is taking place. The clearinghouse 
mechanism could also be used to communicate horizontally to actors 
such as UNDP.  
 
 As Norway becomes more engaged in African SSR, it may have to 
do things differently on a practical level compared to how it 
operated in the Western Balkans. For example, police and defence 
reform projects in Serbia typically involved personnel travelling 
regularly to Serbia for short periods. But in African contexts such as 
Southern Sudan, Norway will likely need to have more people on 
the ground to better understand the local context, and will likely 
need highly competent African personnel with relevant experience 
integrated with the Norwegian team. A model to consider might be 
that practiced by countries such as the UK, with seconded African 
experts as members of their SSR team.  
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 There is growing acknowledgement in the international SSR 
community of the potential for South-South mentoring and 
assistance. That is, in many instances countries that have already and 
recently undergone transitions and reforms of their security sector 
may serve as better mentors and advisers than those from mature 
Western democracies, with their long traditions of democratic 
politics and developed economies. Supporting a South-South model 
for SSR assistance could be relevant, for example, for Norwegian 
engagement in countries with Islamic law and customary justice 
systems, and should be the subject of an assessment.  
 
Recommendation 5: Further develop Norway’s approaches 
towards justice sector reform  
 
 The justice sector is a vital component of SSR. However there is an 
apparent tendency to focus on police reform in Norwegian SSR 
efforts without also paying a similar level of attention to the justice 
sector. Norway should endeavour to focus on all components of the 
security and justice system more comprehensively, and promote 
greater cooperation between those working on justice and police 
sectors reform projects within the same country. 
 
 Norway should also conduct a thorough assessment of how it can 
best contribute to justice sector reform, specifically examining 
Styrkebrønnen (Rule of Law Pool of Experts) model of extended 
bilateral team deployments of senior justice sector experts to address 
the „chain of justice‟ in a holistic, integrated manner. This is a 
unique model of donor assistance which has functioned very well 
under the appropriate circumstances. However in more challenging 
environments the Rule of Law Pool model has encountered 
problems. It is worth examining how the problems with this unique 
model for justice sector assistance can be addressed and resolved. 
 
 
Recommendation 6: Develop framework for deciding when and 
how to outsource SSR assistance and develop more robust 
evaluations for outsourced SSR assistance. 
 Another issue for consideration in developing Norway‟s approach to 
SSR is the practice of using Norwegian NGOs as major channels for 
development aid. There is a strong pattern of reliance on Norwegian 
or other Nordic-based NGOs as channels for assistance. This is not 
problematic when those NGOs are the best qualified to conduct the 
work in that particular context. In the SSR field, Norway should hire 
the best organization for the job, without making nationality of the 
organization the primary consideration. It should thus consider 
merit-based factors such as the track record of NGOs, local 
experience, and relevant substantive expertise.           
 
 International implementing partners such as IMG and DCAF, which 
have received substantial Norwegian funding for SSR projects, 
should be subject to the same standards of monitoring, evaluation 
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and transparency that are required of Norwegian governmental and 
non-governmental actors. We recommend impartial and independent 
external evaluations of several of the major projects these 
organizations have implemented with Norwegian funding.   
 
 Norway, which is a major contributor to UNDP generally, should 
also consider requiring impartial and independent evaluations of 
UNDP‟s Rule of Law and SSR-related programmes. Although these 
programmes have not been a particular focus of this study, several 
respondents voiced concern about inadequate planning and 
assessments, inefficiencies, and accountability deficits in certain 
contexts. In addition to paying more attention to these elements 
when deciding whether to fund major UN programmes on SSR-
related subjects, Norway should also consider initiating its own 
needs assessments, monitoring or evaluations when existing 
arrangements for programmes that it supports are deemed to be 
inadequate.  
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List of Interviewees 
Utenriksdepartementet (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
 
Bjørn Andersen. Counsellor, Norwegian Embassy, Khartoum, Sudan. 
 
Jannicke Bain. Senior Adviser, Western Balkans Section. 
 
Haakon Blankenborg. Senior Advisor, Western Balkans Section 
 
Thorvald Boye. Counsellor, Norwegian Embassy, Abidjan, Cote d‟Ivoire. 
 
Kjell Harald Dalen. Senior Advisor, Africa II Section.  
 
Torun Dramdal. Senior Advisor, Section for Security Policy and North 
America.  
 
Elisabeth Drøyer. Senior Advisor, Section for Security Policy and North 
America. 
 
Lornts Finanger. Senior Advisor. Section for South-Asia and Afghanistan.  
 
Anne Kjersti Frøholm. Senior Advisor, Section for Security Policy and 
North America.  
 
Hilde R. Johansen. Senior Advisor. Africa I Section.  
 
Hanne-Marie Kaarstad. Senior Advisor, Africa II Section.  
 
Hilde Klemetsrud. Head of Project for Women, Peace and Security, Section 
for Global Initiatives and Gender Equality.  
 
Rina Kristmoen. Counsellor, Norwegian Embassy, Nairobi, Kenya.  
 
Odd Berner Malme. Police Adviser/Counsellor, Permanent Mission of 
Norway to the UN, New York. 
 
Odd Magne Ruud. Assistant Director General/Head of Sudan-team, Africa 
II-section - Region around the Horn of Africa. 
 
Eivind Vad Petersson. Consul, Political and Humanitarian Affairs  
Norwegian Consulate General in Juba, South Sudan. 
 
 
NORAD (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation) 
Petter Bauch. Senior Advisor, Peace, Gender and Democracy Department. 
 
Randi Lotsberg. Senior Advisor, Peace, Gender and Democracy Department.  
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Hanne Thonstad. Advisor, Department for Quality Assurance, Statistics 
Team.  
 
 
Forsvarsdepartementet / Militæret (Ministry of Defence /Armed Forces) 
Terje Haaverstad. Former Defence Attaché to Serbia, Montenegro and 
Macedonia, 2006-2010. 
 
Paal Zandstra Krokeide. Senior Advisor, Department of Security Policy. 
 
Ingjerd Kroken. Senior Advisor, Department of Security Policy.  
 
Sigurd Marstein. Senior Advisor, Section for Security Policy and 
International Operations. 
 
Børre Rikardsen. Lieutenant Colonel. Lieutenant Colonel, Department of 
Security Policy. 
 
Finn-Joachim Ruge, Senior Advisor, Department of Security Policy. 
 
 
 
Forsvarets stabsskole / NODEFIC (Norwegian Defence University 
College) 
Jakob Heradstveit. Senior Advisor DSSR. NODEFIC/ Norwegian Defence 
Command and Staff College. 
 
Per Erik Rønning. Colonel. Former Deputy Security Sector Reform 
Coordinator, MONUC. 
 
Atle Svendsen. Major. Program Manager DSSR, Norwegian Defence 
International Centre. 
 
 
Forsvarets forskninginstitutt (Norwegian Defence Research 
Establishment) 
Guro Lien. 
 
Tore Nyhamar. Project Leader, Conflict Analysis. Research Director, 
Challenges in Peace and Stabilization Operations. 
 
 
Justisdepartementet / Rettsvesenet (Ministry of Justice / Justice) 
Heidi Bottolfs. Senior Advisor, Section for European and International 
Affairs. 
 
Torolv Groseth. Judge President. Eidsivating Court of Appeal. Former Head 
of Mission, Norwegian Mission of Legal Advisers to Afghanistan.  
 
Hans Inge Jørstad. Rule of Law Officer, OSCE Office in Baku, Azerbaijan 
 
Pål Meland. Senior Advisor, Ministry of Justice.   
Sissel Irene Wilsgård. Senior Advisor.   
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Politidirektoratet (POD)  (The National Police Directorate of Norway)  
Ellen Ahnfelt. Project Manager/Senior Advisor, POD. 
 
Steinar Aune. Assistant Chief of Police, International Section. 
 
Henning Høgseth. Assistant Chief of Police, Head of International Section. 
 
Iver Frigaard. Senior Advisor, International Section. 
 
Tor Skottum. Assistant Chief of Police, International Section.  
 
Ole Anton Utvær. Assistant Chief of Police, International Section. 
 
 
Politihøgskolen (The Norwegian Police University College) 
Dag Dahlen. Police Superintendent, International Section. 
 
Tor Tanke Holm. Head of Post-Graduate Studies. 
 
Andre fra politiet (Others from the police) 
Gna Gudjønsdottir. Police Superintendent, Iceland Police / Team Leader, 
Donor Aid Coordinating Team, UNMIL (United Mission In Liberia) 
 
Tone Midttun. Chief of Police (retired), former Police Advisor in NORAF, 
Afghanistan. 
 
 
Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights - 
NORDEM  
Karin Lisa Kirkengen. Project Coordinator NORDEM, Norwegian Centre 
for Human Rights, University of Oslo. 
 
 
NRC Flyktninghjelpen (Norwegian Refugee Council) 
Benedicte Givær. Director Emergency Response, Emergency Response 
Department. 
 
Fernando de Medina-Rosales. ICLA Advisor, International Programme 
Department.  
 
Jochen Peters. Project Manager, UN MSU Standby Team of Mediation 
Experts.  Emergency Response Department.  
 
Norsk utenrikspolitisk Institutt - NUPI  
Helge Lurås, Advisor, Department of Security and Conflict Management. 
 
 
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces - DCAF 
Daniel de Torres. Deputy Head, Special Programmes. 
 
Mark Downes. Head of the International Security Sector Advisory Team 
(ISSAT). 
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Antje Fritz, Programme Manager, Security Sector Advisory Programme and 
Kosovo Programme, Operations Division Europe. 
 
Bard Knudsen. Senior Fellow, Operations. 
 
Darko Stankic. Assistant Director and Head of Operations. 
 
Gregor Zore, Senior Diplomatic Advisor, Operations Division Europe. 
 
United Nations - UN 
Alejandro Alvarez. Adviser, Rule of Law, Justice & Security, Conflict 
Prevention and Recovery Team, Bureau for Crisis Prevention & Recovery, 
UNDP, Geneva. 
 
Dmitry Titov. Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security 
Institutions, DPKO, New York. 
 
